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77-17-1

THE TRIAL

candidate for discharge. The court shall conduct a hearing, in accordance with
Section 77-16a-302, within ten business days after receipt of that notice.
(3) The court may not discharge an individual whose mental illness is in
remission as a result of medication or hospitalization if it can be determined
within reasonable medical probability that without continued medication or
hospitalization the defendant's mental illness will reoccur, making the defendant a substantial danger to himself or others.
History: C. 1953, 77-16a-306, enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 171, § 15.

Effective Dates. -

Laws 1992, ch. 171,

§ 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

CHAPTER 17
THE TRIAL
Section
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77-17-4.
77-17-5.
77-17-6.
77-17-7.

Doubt as to degree - Conviction
only on lowest.
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77-17-8.
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77-17-10.
77-17-11.
77-17-12.
77-17-13.

Mistake in charging offense Procedure.
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Court to determine law; the jury,
the facts.
Jury to retire for deliberation Oath of officer having custody.
Defendant on bail appearing for
trial may be committed.
Expert testimony generally - Notice requirements.

77-17-1. Doubt as to degree - Conviction only on lowest.
When it appears the defendant has committed a public offense and there is
reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees he is guilty, he shall be
convicted only of the lower degree.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References.
- Included offenses,

what constitutes, when jury to be charged,
§ 76-1-402.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Included offenses.
Instructions.
Jury consideration of lesser offenses.
Included offenses.
In prosecution for persistent violation of former Liquor Prohibition Law, charge of unlawful
possession was included within charge of persistent violation, and where prior conviction
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, conviction could be had only for lesser offense of
unlawful possession. State v. Bruno, 69 Utah
444, 256 P. 109 (1927).

Instructions.
In murder prosecution, instruction that jury
"can," instead of "must," convict defendant of
lowest degree in case there was reasonable
doubt of which of two or more degrees defendant was guilty, was proper. State v. Cerar, 60
Utah 208, 207 P. 597 (1922).
Court should submit to the jury the lower
grades of the crime charged, if there is any
evidence to support such an instruction. State
v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 P. 55 (1929).
In prosecution for larceny of suitcase, court
did not err in refusing defendant's instruction
on lesser included offenses, in view of adequate
instruction given by court. State v. Campbell,
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Jury consideration of lesser offenses.
There is nothing that requires the jury to
consider all lesser included offenses simultaneously with the charged offense, and trial
court did not err by instructing the jury, in
effect, to determine if defendant was guilty of
the charged offense before reviewing the elements of the lesser included offenses. State v.
Clayton, 658 P.2d 624 (Utah 1983).

116 Utah 74, 208 P.2d 530 (1949).
When it is plain that a defendant has committed some crime, this section reflects an
important policy of resolving reasonable doubts
as to the degree of guilt in the defendant's favor.
Therefore jury instructions on this point should
follow the statutory language as closely as
possible. State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations§ 216.
A.L.R. - Retrial on greater offense following
reversal of plea-based conviction of lesser of-

77-17-2.

Discharging
for state.

fense, 14 A.L.R.4th 970.
Key Numbers. - Indictment and Informa189(1).
tion

one of several defendants

to testify

When two or more persons are included in the same charge, the court may
at any time, on the application of the prosecuting attorney, direct any
defendant to be discharged or his case severed so that he may be a witness for
the prosecution.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Self-incriminating testimony.
While dismissal of prosecution against defendant so that he might be a witness for the state
would bar his further prosecution for same
offense, it would not give him any immunity for

any other crime he might reveal while testifying so that he could refuse to answer any
question ifit tended to incriminate him for any
other crime. In re Petty, 18 Utah 2d 320, 422
P.2d 659 (1967).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations§ 145.

Key Numbers. - Indictment and Information
124(3).

77-1 7-3. Discharge for insufficient

evidence.

When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient evidence to put a
defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith order him discharged.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
.ANALYSIS

Motion for directed verdict.
- Waiver of claim.

Motion for directed verdict .
At defendant's trial for second degree murder, it was harmless error for trial court to rule
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promptly on defendant's motion for a directed
verdict at close of prosecutor's case, since state
had made out a clear prima facie case. State v.
Smith, 675 P.2d 521 (Utah 1983).

not waive the claim by failing to take exception
when the court took the matter under advisement, and the error was not harmless since the
state had not established a prima facie case
against the defendant and that error and others affected the jury's decision. State v.
Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992).

-Waiver of claim.
After the trial court erred by not ruling on
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at
the close of the state's case, the defendant did

77-17-4.

Conspiracy
necessary.

-

Pleading

-

Evidence

-

Proof

On a trial for conspiracy in a case where an overt act is necessary to
constitute the offense, the defendant shall not be convicted unless one or more
overt acts are expressly alleged in the information or indictment, and unless
one of the acts alleged has been proved. However, proof of overt acts not alleged
may be given in evidence.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. - Criminal conspiracy,
§§ 76-4-201, 76-4-202, 76-4-301, 76-4-302.

Pornography, conspiracy as to,§ 76-10-1214.
Restraint of trade, conspiracy, §§ 76-10-911
to 76-10-926.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Overt act.
Proof required.

Overt act.
The crime of conspiracy to commit insurance
fraud does not require an overt act of fraud
directly against the insurance company, such as
the filing of a claim, but may be evidenced by a
remote act, such as paying a third party to
commit arson, since the purpose of the "overt

act" requirement is to show that a conspiracy is
at work, and is not solely in the minds of the
conspirators. State v. Miller, 677 P.2d 1129
(Utah 1984).

Proof required.
The state must have proved, without aid of
the admissions of the defendants themselves,
the corpus delicti and the overt acts upon trial
of conspiracy indictment. State v. Erwin, 101
Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy
§ 40.
C.J.S. - 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 90.
A.L.R. - Right of defendants in prosecution

77-17-5.

for criminal conspiracy to separate trials, 82
A.L.R.3d 366.
Key Numbers. - Conspiracy <Sa>43(12).

Proof of corporate existence

or powers generally.

In a criminal case the existence, constitution or powers of any corporation
may be proved by general reputation, or by the printed statutes of the state,
government or country by which this corporation was created.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

Proof of corporate existence.
In prosecution for forgery, testimony that
certain corporation was organized under laws
of Maine was incompetent to prove existence of
corporation, since this did not amount to proof
by reputation. State v. Brown, 33 Utah 109, 93
P. 52 (1907).
Corporate existence of railroad company
could be shown by proof that general reputation

of railroad company was that it was a corporation and transacted business as such. State v.
Reese, 44 Utah 256, 140 P. 126 (1914).
In arson prosecution proof of corporate existence of insurance company by policy of insurance was insufficient, since policy was not ancient document (and thus self-proving), and
proof was required to be made. State v.
Marasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 P.2d 919 (1933).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law

77-17-6.

<S:,,

567.

Lottery tickets - Evidence.

(1) On a trial for violation of any of the lottery provisions of the Utah
Criminal Code, it is not necessary to prove:
(a) The existence of any lottery in which any lottery tickets shall
purport to have been issued;
(b) The actual signing of any ticket or share, or pretended share of any
pretended lottery; or
(c) That any lottery ticket, share or interest was signed or issued by the
authority of any manager, or of any person assuming to have authority as
manager.
(2) In all cases, proof of the sale, furnishing, bartering or procuring of any
lottery ticket, share or interest therein, or of any instrument purporting to be
a ticket, or part or share of any ticket shall be evidence that the share or
interest was signed and issued according to its purport.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-6, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

Cross-References. - Lottery as "gambling"
within Criminal Code, § 76-10-1101.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Lotteries § 22 et seq.
Key Numbers. - Lotteries <S:,, 29.

77-17-7.

Conviction on testimony
struction to jury.

of accomplice

-

In-

(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given to
the effect that such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with caution,
and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge finds the testimony of
the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-7, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. - Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for con-

duct of another, § 76-2-202.
Discharging one of several defendants to testify for state,§ 77-17-2.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
State v. Berg, 613 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1980) (possessor of controlled substance not accomplice of
distributor).

ANALYSIS

Accomplices.
Instructions.
- Discretionary.
Sufficiencyof accomplice testimony.
Cited.

Instructions.

Accomplices.
For cases determining who is an accomplice
under former statute requiring corroboration of
accomplice'stestimony, see People v. Chadwick,
7 Utah 134, 25 P. 737 (1891) (accessory after the
fact); State v. McCurtain, 52 Utah 63, 172 P.
481 (1918) (abortion); State v. Coroles, 74 Utah
94, 277 P. 203 (1929) (defining "accomplice");
State v. Wade, 66 Utah 267, 241 P. 838 (1925)
(adultery with minor); State v. Cragun, 85 Utah
149, 38 P.2d 1071 (1934) (abortion); State v.
Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 70 P.2d 458, 111 A.L.R.
1393 (1937) (implication in same crime); State
v. Fertig, 120 Utah 224, 233 P.2d 347 (1951)
(knowing cooperation in crime); State v. Davie,
121 Utah 184, 240 P.2d 263 (1952) (patrons of
house of prostitution not accomplices of operator); State v. Washington, 25 Utah 2d 111, 476
P.2d 1019 (1970) (no showing of participation);
State v. Georgopoulos, 27 Utah 2d 53, 492 P.2d
1353 (1972) (receiving stolen property); State v.
Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972)
(accomplice chargeable with same offense);

-Discretionary.
An instruction that the jury should view
testimony with caution is entirely discretionary
with the court, and will be reversed only when
that discretion has been abused. State v. Pierce,
722 P.2d 780 (Utah 1986).
Sufficiency of accomplice testimony.
Where two victims were not sure that defendant was one who robbed them, but where
corroborated testimony of defendant's accomplices established that fact, the evidence was
held to be sufficient to sustain a conviction.
State v. Mccullar, 674 P.2d 117 (Utah 1983).
The testimony of two accomplices was sufficient to convict a defendant as an accomplice in
aggravated robbery and theft, even though the
defense presented alibi testimony. State v.
Smith, 706 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1985).
Cited in State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah
1985); State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah
1986); State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah
1988); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah
1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§ 1486.
C.J.S. - 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 1012.
A.L.R. - Propriety of specific jury instruc-

tions as to credibility of accomplices, 4A.L.R.3d
351.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law CS=>507,
508.

77-17-8. Mistake in charging offense - Procedure.
If at any time before verdict or judgment a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, and it appears that there is probable cause to
believe that the defendant is chargeable with another offense, the court may
commit him or require him to give bail under Section 77-20-1 for his
appearance to answer to the proper charge when filed, and may also require
witnesses to give bail for their appearance.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-8, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. -42
tions § 71.

C.J.S. Indictments and Informa-

Key Numbers. - Indictment and Information CS=>57.
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Separation or sequestration
officer having custody.

of jurors - Oath of

( 1) The court, at any time before the submission of the case to the jury, may
permit the jury to separate or order that it be sequestered in charge of a proper
officer.
(2) If the jury is sequestered the officer shall be sworn to keep the jurors
together until the next meeting of the court, to prevent any person from
speaking or communicating with them, and not to do so himself on any subject
connected with the trial, and to return the jury to the court pursuant to its
order.
History: C. 1958, 77-17-9, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Communication between judge and juror.
Discretion of court.
Noon recess.
Communication between judge and juror.
Question by juror in murder prosecution, in a
conversation with the judge in his chambers,
whether the parties were going to introduce
tapes of a conversation between tw.o defendants, which the judge answered that he did
not know and would tell counsel that the juror
had asked and leave it up to counsel, was not
the kind of communication banned by the statutes. State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 P.2d 57
(1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970, 81 S. Ct.
1934, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1259 (1961).
Discretion of court.
It was within court's discretion to allow jury
in murder trial to separate during trial where
there was no objection to such separation. State
v. Cerar, 60 Utah 208, 207 P. 597 (1922).
In murder prosecution, fact that court allowed jury to separate during trial did not
constitute error, such question being for trial
court to determine, especially where no prejudice was shown. State v. Cano, 64 Utah 87, 228
P. 563 (1924).

In murder prosecution where it appeared
that judge admonished jury at each adjournment not to converse among themselves or with
others with regard to trial, and it did not
appear that admonition was not strictly observed, denial of request that jury be kept in
charge of officer was not error, since it was
discretionary with court whether to allow jurors to separate or keep them together. State v.
Seyboldt, 65 Utah 204, 236 P. 225 (1925).
It was within court's discretion to request the
court reporter to take two female jurors to the
restroom and there could be no conjecture on
appeal that there was any impropriety involved. State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d
887 (1957).
The decision whether to sequester the jury is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. State v. Easthope, 668 P.2d 528 (Utah
1983).
Noon recess.
Excusing of jurors for noon hour after conclusion of arguments of counsel was not a separation after the case was submitted to them.
State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369 P.2d 494
(1962).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 1363.
A.L.R. - Separation of jury in criminal case
before introduction of evidence - modem
cases, 72 A.L.R.3d 100.
Separation of jury in criminal case during
trial - modem cases, 72 A.L.R.3d 131.
Separation of jury in criminal case after
submission of cause - modem cases, 72
A.L.R.3d 248.

Juror's reading of newspaper account of trial
in state criminal case during its progress as
ground for mistrial, new trial, or reversal, 46
A.L.R.4th 11.
Juror's reading of newspaper account of trial
in federal criminal case during its progress as
ground for mistrial, new trial, or reversal, 85
A.L.R. Fed. 13.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law ®"' 854(2).
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77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts.
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court,
questions of fact by the jury.
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as
well as fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-10, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Directed verdict.
Province of jury.

Directed verdict.
While the jury were the judges of the facts
and the weight of the evidence and credibility of
the witnesses, and evidence tending to prove an
issue, however slightly, was admissible, it was
a preliminary question for the court, and not
the jury, to decide in every case whether the
evidence would justify a verdict for the party
adducing the evidence. State v. Karas, 43 Utah
506, 136 P. 788 (1913).
The trial court did not err in failing to direct
a verdict of acquittal if the jury could find from
the evidence 'adduced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime
of grand larceny. State v. Peterson, 121 Utah
229, 240 P.2d 504 (1952).
Province of jury.
By statute the jurors were made the sole
judges of the facts and the weight of the evidence. People v. Biddlecome, 3 Utah 208, 2 P.
194 (1882).
Judge must not in liis instructions have invaded the province of the jury, as by expressing

opinion as to the weight of the evidence. State v.
James, 32 Utah 152, 89 P. 460 (1907); State v.
Greene, 33 Utah 497, 94 P. 987 (1908).
The jury were the judges of the credibility of
the witnesses. State v. Bayes, 47 Utah 474, 155
P. 335 (1916).
In prosecution for persistent violation of former Liquor Prohibition Law, prior conviction
was question of fact for determination of jury.
State v. Bruno, 69 Utah 444, 256 P. 109 (1927).
On trial of indictment for homicide, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and
value to be given to their testimony were questions exclusively for the jury. State v. Diaz, 76
Utah 463, 290 P. 727 (1930).
It was the sole and exclusive province of the
jury to determine the facts in all criminal cases,
whether the evidence offered by the state was
weak or strong, was in conflict or was not
controverted. Evidence might be ever so convincing that an accused was guilty of the crime
charged, yet it was for the jury and not for the
trial judge to render the verdict. The trial judge
could not comment upon the evidence, and
certainly could not indicate to the jury that
some material facts, not admitted at the trial,
were established beyond controversy. State v.
Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -75AAm. Jur. 2d Trial§ 714
et seq.
C.J.S. - 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 1273 et
seq.

Key Numbers. - Criminal Law

77-17-11. Jury to retire for deliberation
having custody.

,g::,

732.

- Oath of officer

After hearing the court's instructions and arguments of counsel, the jury
shall retire for deliberation. An officer shall be sworn to keep them together in
some private and convenient place and not permit any person to speak to or
communicate with them or to do so himself except upon the order of the court,
or to ask them whether they have agreed on a verdict. He shall return them to
court when they have agreed and the court has so ordered, or when otherwise
ordered by the court.
605
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History: C. 1953, 77-17-11, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Noon recess.
Requirements.
Separation.
Noon recess.
Excusing of jurors for noon hour after conclusion of arguments of counsel was not a separation after the case was submitted to them.
State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369 P.2d 494
(1962).
Requirements.
Statute contained two requirements: (1) that
jury be kept together in some private and
convenient place, and (2) that no one be permitted to speak or communicate with jurors without permission of court. State v. Jarrett, 112
Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947).
Separation.
Not every separation of a juror gave rise to
claim of prejudice, since absolute isolation was
not reasonably possible. State v. Jarrett, 112
Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947).

Statute did not prevent jurors from separation for purposes of necessity, such as to visit
lavatory, and, while defendant's right to have
jury secluded from outside influences while
deliberating should be jealously guarded, law
must have been construed in keeping with
correlative rights of defendant and jurors. State
v. Jarrett, 112 Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947).
Where only separation of jury was for purpose of necessity, under surveillance of bailiff,
and there was no communication with any
juror, prejudice would not be presumed. State v.
Jarrett, 112 Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947).
Where the separation of a jury was for the
purposes of necessity, under surveillance of
bailiff, and there was no communication with
any juror, prejudice would not be presumed and
the burden was on the defendant to establish
that he was prejudiced by the alleged separation. State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355
P.2d 689 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 922, 82
S. Ct. 246, 7 L. Ed. 2d 137, appeal dismissed,
368 U.S. 144, 82 S. Ct. 247, 7 L. Ed. 2d 188
(1961).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am.Jur.2d.-75BAm.
Jur. 2d Trial§ 1647
et seq.
C.J.S. - 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1362.
A.L.R. - Prejudicial effect, in criminal case,
of communications between witnesses and jurors, 9 A.L.R.3d 1275.
Juror's reading of newspaper account of trial
in state criminal case during its progress as

77-17-12.

Defendant
committed.

ground for mistrial, new trial, or reversal, 46
A.L.R.4th 11.
Criminal law: propriety of reassembling jury
to amend, correct, clarify, or otherwise change
verdict after jury has been discharged, or has
reached or sealed its verdict and separated, 14
A.L.R.5th 89.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law <S:->857(1).

on bail appearing

for trial may be

When a defendant who has given bail appears for trial, the court may, at any
time after his appearance for trial, order him to be committed to the custody of
the proper officer to await the judgment or further order of the court.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-12, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 8 C.J.S. Bail § 136.
Key Numbers. - Bail ,s,;, 80.
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77-17-13.

Expert testimony
ments.

generally

-

Notice require-

(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing,
the party intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing
party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten
days before the hearing. Notice shall include the name and address of the
expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report.
(b) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed
testimony. If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not
adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed
testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that
opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide to the opposing
party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the
testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when
available.
(2) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party
receiving notice shall provide notice to the other party of witnesses whom the
party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the name
and address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. If
available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided. If the rebuttal
expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately inform
concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony, or in the event the
rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party intending to call the rebuttal
witness shall provide a written explanation of the witness's anticipated
rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to
prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by any
rebuttal expert when available.
(3) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of this
section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. If the court finds
that the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad faith on the part
of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-13, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 139, § 3.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 139

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

CHAPTER 18
THE JUDGMENT
Section
77-18-1.

Suspension of sentence - Pleas
held in abeyance - Probation
- Supervision - Presentence investigation - Standards - Confidentiality Terms and conditions - Restitution - Termination, revo-

Section
77-18-2.
77-18-3.
77-18-4.
77-18-5.

607

cation, modification, or extension - Hearings.
Repealed.
Disposition of fines.
Sentence - Term - Construction.
Reports by courts and prosecut-

77-18-1
Section
77-18-5.5.
77-18-6.
77-18-7.
77-18-8.
77-18-9.
77-18-10.

77-18-11.
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ing attorneys to Board of Pardons and Parole.
Judgment of death - Defendant to select method - Time
of selection.
Judgment to pay fine or restitution constitutes a lien.
Costs imposed on defendant Restrictions.
Fine not paid - Commitment.
Definitions.
Petition - Expungement of
records of arrest, investigation, and detention - Eligibility conditions - No filing
fee.
Petition - Expungement of
conviction - Certificate of el-
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(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the
defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court.
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the Department of Corrections.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and
presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the
department. These standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to
determine what level of services shall be provided.
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(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the Department
of Corrections.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures
to implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and
other criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may
supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or
information from other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's
family. The victim impact statement shall:
(i) identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the Department of Corrections
regarding the payment of restitution by the defendant;
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial
relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the
trial court's sentencing determination.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the
Department of Corrections regarding the payment of restitution by the
defendant.
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are confidential and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
Department of Corrections.
(6) The Department of Corrections shall make the presentence investigation
report available for review at the court ten days in advance of sentencing and
shall mail or deliver copies to the defendant, defendant's attorney, and
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prosecutor ten days in advance of sentencing. Any inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and
Department of Corrections prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the
attention of the sentencing judge, and a determination ofrelevance or accuracy
shall be made by the judge on the record. If a party fails to raise an objection
at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may
be required to perform any or all of the following:
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(b) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(d) participate in available treatment programs;
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year;
(f) serve a term of home confinement;
(g) participate in community service restitution programs, including
the community service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance
with Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4); and
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate.
(9) (a) The Department of Corrections is responsible, upon order of the
court, for the collection of fines, restitution, and any other costs assessed
under Section 64-13-21 during the probation period in cases for which the
court orders supervised probation by the department.
(b) The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the
clerk of the court.
(c) The clerk shall place the order on the civil docket and shall provide
notice of the order to the parties.
(d) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines,
restitution, and other amounts outstanding.
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed.
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(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court and
prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination
of supervised probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a
probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding
fines, restitution, and other amounts outstanding.
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to
revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
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(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for willful
and malicious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985.
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at
the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) that persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving
priority for treatment over the defendants described in this subsection.
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, are classified private in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 1,
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; or
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or
the subject's authorized representative.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L.
1980,ch.15,§
2;1981,ch.59,§
2;1982,ch.
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1;
1983,ch.85,§
2;1984,ch.20,§
1;1985,ch.
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114,
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 134, § 2;
1991, ch. 66, § 5; 1991, ch. 206, § 6; 1992, ch.
14, § 3; 1993, ch. 82, § 7; 1993, ch. 220, § 3;
1994, ch. 13, § 24; 1994, ch. 198, § 1; 1994,
ch. 230, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment by ch. 66, effective April 29, 1991, in
Subsection (2)(a) substituted "guilty, guilty and
mentally ill, no contest" for "guilty or no contest" in the first sentence.
The 1991 amendment by ch. 206, effective
April 29, 1991, added Subsection (1), redesignating the following subsections accordingly;
subdivided Subsections (2)(b), (3), (5)(a), (7),
(8)(a), (9)(a), and (10); substituted "appropriations subcommittee" for "appropriations committee" at the end of Subsection (3)(e); substituted
the
language
beginning
with

"presentence" and ending with "court order" for
"report are confidential and not available except" jn Subsection (5)(a)(iii); inserted "evidence" in the first and second sentences of
Subsection (5)(b); added Subsections (5)(c) and
(13); and made several punctuation and stylistic changes throughout the section.
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, added "ipcluding the community service
program provided in Section 78-11-20.7" to the
end of Subsection (6)(g).
The 1993 amendment by ch. 82, effective May
3, 1993, added Subsection (2) and redesignated
former Subsections (2) through (13) as Subsections (3) through (14).
The 1993 amendment by ch. 220, effective
May 3, 1993, added "and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21" in Subsection
(8), substituted "owes" for "has" and "or other
assessed costs" for "owing" and added "and
other amounts outstanding" in Subsection
(9)(a)(ii), substituted "and other amounts out-
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standing'' for "orders" in Subsection (9)(b), and
made stylistic changes.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 13, effective May
2, 1994 substituted "Board of Pardons and
Parole" for "Board of Pardons" in Subsections
(l)(c) and (4)(b); substituted "Title 77, Chapter
2a, Pleas in Abeyance" for "Sections 77-2a-1
through 77-2a-4" in Subsection (2); substituted
"Subsection (4)(a)" for "Subsection (a)" in Subsection (4)(d); and made stylistic changes.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 198, effective
May 2, 1994, added Subsection (6)(a)(ii), renumbering former Subsections (6)(a)(ii) and
(iii)as (iii) and (iv), and made a stylistic change.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 230, effective
May 2, 1994, deleted former Subsection (1)
which defined "confidential"; inserted "and Parole"in Subsection (3)(b); added Subsection (6);
designated former Subsection (6)(b) as Subsection (7); deleted former Subsection (6)(c) pertaining to the disposition of the presentence
investigation report after the sentencing; deleted former Subsection (14), relating to disclosure of presentence diagnostic evaluation and
investigation reports; added Subsection (15);
and made related and other stylistic changes.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
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Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6
proposed amending Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12
and proposed adding a new Sec. 28 to that
article. These proposals were approved by the
voters, the changes to take effect on January 1,
1995. Laws 1994, ch. 198, which amended this
section to add the requirement of a victim
impact statement, provides in § 16 that the
Legislature intends the act to serve as the
implementing legislation of those constitutional amendments.
Severability Clauses. - Section 3 of Laws
1983, Chapter 85 provided: "If any provision of
this act, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of this act shall be given effect
without the invalid provision or application."
Cross-References. - Indecent public display, incarceration without suspension of sentence, § 76-10-1228.
Payment of costs of defense as condition of
probation or suspension, § 77-32a-6.
Presentence investigation reports, Rules
4-607, 6-301, Rules of Judicial Administration.
Rules of Evidence inapplicable to sentencing
and probation proceedings, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 1101.
Voluntary commitment to Division of Mental
Health, § 62A-12-228(3).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
port to protect them; in such cases, disclosure to
a defendant of as much of the report as possible
should be made with identifying indicia of a
person who would be threatened excluded from
the report, sealed, and included in the record on
appeal; in all other cases, full disclosure of the
report should be made. State v. Casarez, 656
P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982).

ANALYSIS

Disclosure of presentence report to defendant.
Discretion of trial court.
Due process.
Extension of probation.
Habeas corpus.
Presentence reports.
Restitution.
-Death of defendant.
Revocation of probation.
-Grounds.
-Nature of proceeding.
-Nature of violation.
-Notice of grounds.
-Right to counsel at hearing.
-Standard of proof.
-Time for proceedings.
- Written findings.
Suspended sentence.
-Revocation of suspension.
Suspension of probation.
Termination of probation period.
Terms of probation.
Cited.

Disclosure ofpresentence report to defen•
dant.
Only when disclosure of the presentence report would jeopardize the life or safety of third
parties should there be deletions from the re-

Discretion of trial court.
When it appeared that a trial judge had
exercised discretion in suspending imposition
of sentence or in revoking probation and imposing sentence, after a hearing, the judgment of
the trial court should not have been molested.
Williams v. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640
(1944).
A temporary stay for the purpose of determining the present disposition and mental attitude of the convicted person, before granting
an indefinite one, was within the discretion of
the trial court. Demmick v. Harris, 107 Utah
471, 155 P.2d 170 (1945).
Whether one convicted of crime, and subject
to punishment therefor, should be placed on
probation was a matter within discretion of
trial court, and if court was doubtful whether
granting probation during good behavior was
compatible with the public interest, it should
make such investigation as its judgment die-
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tates as to the attitudes of the person convicted.
Demmick v. Harris, 107 Utah 471, 155 P.2d 170
(1945).
Probation was not a matter ofright, but if the
trial court gave as a sole reason for denial that
defendant did not admit his guilt it might have
been an injustice under some circumstances.
State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388
(1957).
When, in sentencing defendant, the trial
judge indicated that he had no choice but to
impose a mandatory five-year-to-life sentence
for selling drugs, and, in fact, he had discretion
to grant probation, the sentence was vacated
and remanded for a new sentence to be imposed
without judge's feeling compelled to impose the
statutory sentence. State v. Scott, 26 Utah 2d
302, 488 P.2d 1046 (1971).

Due process.
Probationer who presented himself in court
to make probation report could not later attack
by habeas corpus court's action setting aside
stay order and committing him to prison, on
ground that no warrant, citation, or summons
was issued. Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1,
163 P.2d 314 (1945).
Where a party was convicted and sentenced
to a term in the state prison for issuing a
fictitious check and was placed under the supervision of the adult probation and parole
department, released from custody and was
later granted three additional stays of execution, it must be concluded that he was placed on
probation in the interest of reformation and
that there was an implied agreement that the
stay would not be terminated during his good
behavior and, therefore, termination without
hearing or claim of misconduct was a denial of
due process of law. McPhie v. Turner, 10 Utah
2d 237, 351 P.2d 91 (1960).
In a habeas corpus proceeding, where the
plaintiff had been convicted and placed on
probation and later was notified that he had
been charged with having committed a second
crime while on probation, the plaintiff was not
denied due process of law when, at a hearing
which was held when he appeared in open court
on his regular reporting day, he was committed
to prison under his original sentence. Baine v.
Chesnut, 11 Utah 2d 142, 356 P.2d 36 (1960).
Trial court did not jeopardize defendant's due
process rights by refusing to entertain his motion to continue sentencing to obtain a personal
examination and evaluation by the treatment
facilities that had rejected him, because defendant had full and complete access to the presentence report and a diagnostic evaluation for
almost two weeks before the hearing and had
the opportunity to contest effectively any perceived factual inaccuracies. State v. Rhodes,
818 P.2d 1048 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Extension of probation.
Proceedings for extension of probation commenced prior to termination of the original
term gave the court jurisdiction over the defendant until conclusion of those proceedings.
State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
Habeas corpus.
Scope of review of revocation order by habeas
corpus was jurisdictional only and trial court's
compliance with due process would be inquired
into insofar as it was jurisdictional question.
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d
314 (1945).
Presentence reports.
Failure to furnish defendant with copy of
presentencing report prior to sentencing was
not prejudicial error where sentencing court
had stated specific information in the report
upon which it relied and thus given defendant
an opportunity to refute the matter and defendant did not contend that any of the information was inaccurate or false or that he was
precluded from presenting any mitigating circumstances. State v. Roberts, 612 P.2d 360
(1980).
Trial court did not err in receiving and considering a presentence report when the author
of a part of the report did not appear and testify
in open court at the presentence hearing; the
report had been disclosed to the defendant who
made no objection to the inclusion of that part
of the report or to its accuracy. State v. Anderson, 632 P.2d 877 (Utah 1981).
There was no error in trial court's consideration of a presentence report that contained a
reference to defendant's confession to another
criminal charge and the proceeding thereon
although the defendant had been acquitted of
the charge after a finding of guilt by the jury.
State v. Lipsky, 639 P.2d 174 (Utah 1981).
Fact that record did not substantiate that
defendant or his counsel viewed presentence
report did not amount to prejudicial error
where there was nothing to indicate that their
opportunity to view the report was thwarted.
State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213 (Utah 1983).
Where information as to defendant's sexual
misconduct was reliable and he was given adequate notice of the allegations and defendant
did not attempt to call the victim and crossexamine her or take the stand himself, the
court was justified in relying on evidence of
defendant's sexual misconduct in sentencing
defendant for burglary. State v. Sweat, 722 P.2d
746 (Utah 1986).
Restitution.
Court had authority to order restitution for
actual damages of victim as a condition of
probation where defendant had pleaded guilty
to an attempt to commit the crime charged.
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State v. Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 150 P.2d 970
(1944).
Where no criminal prosecution was instituted, the probation court, for the purposes of
the proceeding before it, could determine the
truth or falsity of the facts alleged as constituting parole violation in the same manner as it
might inquire into and determine the fact relative to an alleged violation not involving criminality. State v. Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 150 P.2d
970 (1944).

State v. Garnick, 619 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1980).
The court did not exceed its authority in
ordering the defendant, convicted of committing arson upon his house, to reimburse insurance companies for their loss in compensating
the bank which acquired the house through
foreclosure. State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah
1985).

The state can enforce restitution as both a
condition of probation under this section, and
as a separate and independant component of
the court's judgment and the defendant's original sentence under §§ 76-3-201(3), (5), and
76-3-201.1(1). The expiration of the court's jurisdiction to require payment ofrestitution as a
condition of probation, therefore, does not diminish the enforceability of restitution as an
independent component of the sentence decreed in the judgment. State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d
1203 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 853
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
Court may maintain bench probation to enforce the payment of restitution, even if the
resulting probation period would be longer
than the maximum formal probation period for
the offenses involved. State v. Robinson, 860
P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

-Death of defendant.
Defendant's death during the pendency of his
appeal from a conviction for failure to pay taxes
did not abate the conviction and a restitution
order was unaffected. State v. Christensen, 866
P.2d 533 (Utah 1993).
Revocation of probation.
The power to revoke probation must be exercised within legislatively established limits.
State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988).
-Grounds.
Defendant's failure to make bona fide efforts
to maintain full-time verifiable employment
and to pay his fine and restitution was a willful
violation of his probation agreement and revocation was justified. State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d
989 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
-Nature of proceeding.
Proceeding for the revocation of probation
was not a criminal prosecution. State v. Bonza,
106 Utah 553, 150 P.2d 970 (1944).
Though the ground for revocation be the
commission of another crime, defendant was
not convicted thereof so that punishment might
be imposed in such proceeding for the subsequent offense. He was not placed in jeopardy as
to such offense. The cause of revocation need
not have constituted a crime, so that conviction
of some subsequent offense was not essential.
The question to be determined was whether the
defendant's conduct subsequent to sentence
was in violation of the conditions imposed by
the court for a continuance of his probation.

77-18-1

-Nature of violation.
To support revocation of probation for the
violation of a condition of probation not involving the payment of money, the violation must
be willful or, if not willful, must presently
threaten the safety of society. State v. Hodges,
798 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Defendant who willfully refused to sign the
probation agreement violated probation. State
v. Ruesga, 851 P.2d 1229 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
-Notice of grounds.
Defendant was denied his due process right
to notice of the grounds on which revocation of
his probation was sought where the order to
show cause served on defendant claimed only
one ground for revocation of the probation and
the trial court relied solely on another ground,
of which the defendant had no notice, in revoking the probation. State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d
487 (Utah 1981).
Probationer is entitled to written notice of
the grounds on which revocation of probation is
sought. State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d 487 (Utah
1981).
Notice of probation revocation proceedings
within the probation period is required in order
to revoke a defendant's probation. Smith v.
Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990).
-Right to counsel at hearing.
Inasmuch as hearing to revoke probation
involved possibility of changing defendant's
status from one of being at liberty to one of
being in confinement, it was regarded "as an
important stage of the proceeding against him"
at which he should have the assistance of
counsel if he so desired. State v. Eichler, 25
Utah 2d 421, 483 P.2d 887 (1971).
-Standard of proof.
The standard to be used in proving a violation of a condition of probation is a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d
270 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
-Time for proceedings.
This section requires only that revocation
proceedings be initiated within the probation
period and not that the proceeding also be
completed by the end of the probation period.
State v. Kahl, 814 P.2d 1151 (Utah Ct. App.
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1991), cert. denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992)
(decided under 1980 version, before addition of
Subsection (ll)(b)).
State was not responsible for unreasonable
delay in completing revocation proceedings
when defendant fled the jurisdiction before his
probation revocation proceeding could be completed. State v. Kahl, 814 P.2d 1151 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991), cert. denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah
1992) (decided under 1980 version, before addition of Subsection (ll)(b)).

- Written findings.
Written findings of fact are not necessary in
every judicial probation revocation. A complete
trial court record and transcript can suffice in
lieu of written findings. However, the record
and transcript must reveal the evidence relied
on and the reasons for revoking probation.
State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
Suspended sentence.
Right of person to personal liberty on a suspended sentence could not be alternately
granted and denied without just cause. State v.
Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044, 54 A.L.R.
1463 (1927); McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407,
160 P.2d 721 (1945); Christiansen v. Harris, 109
Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314 (1945).
When a sentence was suspended during good
behavior, without reservations, person whose
sentence was thus suspended had a vested
right to rely thereon so long as that condition
was complied with. State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah
296, 259 P. 1044, 54 A.L.R. 1463 (1927).
Suspension of sentence would excuse timely
enforcement of sentence of imprisonment.
Mackelprangv. Walker, 74 Utah 121,277 P. 401
(1929).
-Revocation
of suspension.
For cases discussing the rights of one granted
a suspended sentence, see State v. Zolantakis,
70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044, 54 A.L.R. 1463
(1927); Thompson v. Harris, 106 Utah 32, 144
P.2d 761 (1943), rehearing denied, 107 Utah 99,
152 P.2d 91 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 845,
65 S. Ct. 676, 89 L. Ed. 1406 (1945); McCoy v.
Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945);
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d
314 (1945); Williams v. Harris, 106 Utah 387,
149 P.2d 640 (1944); State v. Bonza, 106 Utah
553, 150 P.2d 970 (1944).
In the absence of proof of fraud, a court could
not properly vacate an order setting aside a
conviction, merely because of its belief that
fraud had been practiced to procure the original
order. State v. Schreiber, 121 Utah 653, 245
P.2d 222 (1952).
Suspension of probation.
Suspension of the period of probation during
the time a person is in confinement awaiting a

revocation hearing does not place that person
in a "state of perpetual limbo,"because whether
the time spent in confinement will constitute
service of probation is contingent on the final
determination of the revocation proceedings.
State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798 (Utah 1990).

Termination of probation period.
Former Subsection (l0)(a) required that the
offender "shall" be terminated from sentence if
18 months' probation was completed without
violation. This strong mandate was not consistent with the argument that the 18-month term
was "tolled" when any violation occurs within
the period and that there was no time limit for
initiating a revocation action. State v. Green,
757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988).
The 1984 amendment, which limited the
time a person can be placed on probation to 18
months, pursuant to § 68-3-3 should not apply
retroactively. Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah
1990).
Probation may not be retroactively revoked
no matter how clear it subsequently appears
that probation requirements were not followed,
if no enforcement action is taken prior to the
elapse of the term of probation. State v. Moya,
815 P.2d 1312 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Terms of probation.
Trial court, in granting stay of execution,
could require compliance with conditions usually imposed on those placed on probation during good behavior, as a condition to keeping in
force stay of order until date of its expiration.
Demmick v. Harris, 107 Utah 471, 155 P.2d 170
(1945).
The terms of the probation need not have
been part of the order suspending the sentence.
It was sufficient where the judge placed the
defendant in the custody of the probation officer. The terms of the probation were clearly set
forth in the probation agreement which, although prepared by the probation officer, was a
standard form which the court adopted to apprise the accused of what was expected of him.
If the defendant considered any of the terms
unjust, he had ample opportunity to present his
dissatisfaction to the court on the dates set for
hearing and report. State v. Fedder, 1 Utah 2d
117, 262 P.2d 753 (1953).
Every order granting probation must have
been conditioned upon the good behavior of the
defendant. State v. Chesnut, 11 Utah 2d 142,
356 P.2d 36 (1960).
Where the probation order imposed conditions upon the defendant which were that he
remain in custody and supervision of his bondsman, that he remain outside a certain county,
that he report to the court on a certain date and
that he "make every effort to make entirely
good," the order contained terms somewhat at
variance with usual orders, but it was not so
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v. Reedeker, 534 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1975).
The probationary time period could be longer
than the maximum time of imprisonment for
the offense. State v. Allmendinger, 565 P.2d
1119 (Utah 1977).

indefinite and uncertain as to be unenforceable
and the trial judge, after a hearing, could
terminate the probation. State v. Chesnut, 11
Utah 2d 142, 356 P.2d 36 (1960).
Defendant who was found guilty of one count
of theft by deception in the amount of $563.80
could not be required, as a condition of his
probation, to repay his employer the total
amount of all similar thefts which had occurred
over a period of years, but with which alleged
thefts defendant had never been charged. State

Cited in State v. Denney, 776 P.2d 91 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989); State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); United States v. Peck,
762 F. Supp. 315 (D. Utah 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Brigham Young Law Review. - Testing
the Limits of the Court's Exclusive Jurisdiction
in Fraud Cases: Discharge v. Criminal Restitution, 1984 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 61.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§§ 557 to 579.
C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1549 et
seq.
A.L.R. - Propriety of conditioning probation
or suspended sentence on defendant's refraining from political activity, protest or the like, 45
A.L.R.3d 1022.
State court's power to place defendant on
probation without imposition of sentence, 56
A.L.R.3d 932.
What constitutes "good behavior" within
statute or judicial order expressly conditioning
suspension of sentence thereon, 58 A.L.R.3d
1156.
Ability to pay as necessary consideration in
conditioning probation or suspended sentence
upon reparation or restitution, 73 A.L.R.3d
1240.
Propriety of condition of probation which
requires defendant convicted of crime of violence to make reparation to injured victim, 79
A.L.R.3d 976.
Validity of requirement that, as condition of
probation, indigent defendant reimburse defense costs, 79 A.L.R.3d 1025.
Propriety of conditioning probation upon defendant's posting of bond guaranteeing compliance with terms of probation, 79A.L.R.3d 1068.
Validity of requirement that, as condition of
probation, defendant submit to warrantless
searches, 79 A.L.R.3d 1083.
Validity of state statute imposing mandatory
sentence or prohibiting granting of probation or

suspension of sentence for narcotic offenses, 81
A.L.R.3d 1192.
Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant's serving part of probationary period in
jail or prison, 6 A.L.R.4th 446.
Admissibility of hearsay evidence in probation revocation hearings, 11 A.L.R.4th 999.
Probation officer's liability for negligent supervision of probationer, 44 A.L.R.4th 638.
Admissibility of expert testimony as to appropriate punishment for convicted defendant, 47
A.L.R.4th 1069.
Appealability of order suspending imposition
or execution of sentence, 51 A.L.R.4th 939.
Probation revocation: insanity as defense, 56
A.L.R.4th 1178.
Propriety of conditioning probation or defendant's submission to polygraph or other lie
detector testing, 86 A.L.R.4th 709.
Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant's submission to drug testing, 87 A.L.R.4th
929.
Determination that state failed to prove
charges relied upon for revocation of probation
as barring subsequent criminal action based on
same underlying charges, 2 A.L.R.5th 262.
Measure and elements ofrestitution to which
victim is entitled under state criminal statute,
15 A.L.R.5th 391.
Propriety, in criminal case, of federal district
court order restricting defendant's right to reenter or stay in United States, 94 A.L.R. Fed.
619.
What constitutes unusually "vulnerable" victim under Sentencing Guideline § 3Al.1 permitting increase in offense level, 114 A.L.R.
Fed. 355.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e:a 982 to
982.8.

77-18-2·. Repealed.
Repeals. - Laws 1994, ch. 143 repeals§ 7718-2, as last amended by Laws 1993, ch. 234,
§ 389, providing for expungement and sealing
of records, effective May 2, 1994. For present
provisions, see § 77-18-9 et seq.
Laws 1994, ch. 72, § 2 amended this section,

but Laws 1994, ch. 143, § 12 provides that that
act, which repealed this section, supersedes ch.
72. Laws 1994, ch. 13, § 25 also amended this
section, but because of the repeal, the amendment has not been given effect.
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Disposition

of fines.

Fines imposed by the district court shall be paid into the General Fund,
except fines received in counties that are not within the state district court
administrative system. Those fines shall be paid to the county treasurer.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-3, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15,§ 2;1981,ch.90,§
4;1988,ch.
152, § 17.
Cross-References. - Circuit court fines,

fees, and forfeitures, disposition of, § 78-4-22.
Wildlife Resources Account, fish and game
fines paid into, § 23-14-13.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Fines § 19.
Key Numbers. - Fines <S=>20.

77-18-4.

Sentence

-Term

- Construction.

( 1) Whenever a person is convicted of a crime and the judgment provides for
a commitment to the state prison, the court shall not fix a definite term of
imprisonment unless otherwise provided by law.
(2) The sentence and judgment of imprisonment shall be for an indeterminate term of not less than the minimum and not to exceed the maximum term
provided by law for the particular crime.
(3) Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, every sentence, regardless of its form or terms, which purports to be for a shorter or different period
of time, shall be construed to be a sentence for the term between the minimum
and maximum periods of time provided by law and shall continue until the
maximum period has been reached unless sooner terminated or commuted by
authority of the Board of Pardons and Parole.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-4, enacted by L.
1980,ch.15,§
2; 1994,ch. 13,§ 26.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, designated the
formerly undesignated paragraphs as Subsections (1) to (3) and substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for "Board of Pardons" in
Subsection (3).

Cross-References. - Board of Pardons,
§ 77-27-1 et seq.
Controlled Substances Act, violations, sentencing, § 58-37-8.
Punishments, Criminal Code, § 76-3-101 et
seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
vacated sentence; in view of absurdity of maximum sentence of life imprisonment minus
thirty months, credit was to be applied by
prison officials and Board of Pardons in determining time for probation and termination of
sentence. State v. Jaramillo, 25 Utah 2d 328,
481 P.2d 394 (1971).

ANALYSIS

Credit for time served on vacated sentence.
Effect of subsequent statute.
Habitual criminal.
Indeterminate sentence.
Power of Board of Pardons.
Validity of sentence.
Credit for time served on vacated sentence.
Defendant who had served thirty months of
robbery sentence (five years to life) before it
was vacated and who was thereafter committed
after jury trial for same offense was entitled to
credit on second sentence for time served on

Effect of subsequent statute.
Sentence imposed upon one convicted of
crime could not be affected by a statute subsequently passed. In re Clawson, 5 Utah 358, 15
P. 328 (1887).
Habitual criminal.
An indeterminate sentence of from one to ten
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years was not a sentence of not less than three
years as that term was used in former habitual
criminal statute which defined habitual criminal as one who had been previously twice
convicted and sentenced for terms of not less
than three years each. State v. Walsh, 106 Utah
22, 144 P.2d 757 (1943).

Indeterminate sentence.
An indeterminate sentence was in law a
sentence for the maximum period prescribed by
law for the particular offense committed, subject to provisions that it could be sooner terminated by the Board of Pardons. Mutart v. Pratt,
51 Utah 246, 170 P. 67 (1917); State v. Empey,
65 Utah 609, 239 P. 25, 44 A.L.R. 558 (1925);
Lee Lim v. Davis, 75 Utah 245, 284 P. 232, 76
A.L.R. 460 (1929).
Sentence under former indeterminate sentence law was for maximum period or term
prescribed for particular offense. State v. Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P.2d 584 (1937).
An indeterminate sentence was a definite
sentence for the maximum term therein stated,
unless it was commuted or terminated or the
prisoner was paroled or pardoned by the Board
of Pardons. State v. Nemier, 106 Utah 307, 148
P.2d 327 (1944).
Power of Board of Pardons.
State Board of Pardons had jurisdiction and
authority to fix and determine time a person
shall serve when sentenced under former indeterminate sentence law at any period equal to
or less than maximum penalty provided by law,

77-18-5

and it was not mandatory that it apply "good
conduct time" allowance provided in "good behavior" statute. Cardisco v. Davis, 91 Utah 323,
64 P.2d 216 (1937).
Under procedure the final determination in
all cases was left to the Board of Pardons. Even
where the prisoner was convicted and sentenced as an habitual criminal for a term of not
less than fifteen years under the statute, the
minimum was not binding on that board. State
v. Walsh, 106 Utah 22, 144 P.2d 757 (1943).

Validity of sentence.
A sentence in excess of court's power to impose was not totally void, where erroneous and
excessive sentence was severable into parts. In
such case the sentence was bad as to the excess
and good as to that which court had power to
impose. Reese v. Olsen, 44 Utah 318, 139 P. 941
(1914).
Although sentence to term of not less than
twenty years for pandering, when statute provided that crime should carry a sentence of
imprisonment for a term of not more than
twenty years, was erroneous, it was not void.
State v. Gates, 118 Utah 182, 221 P.2d 878
(1950).
Sentence was lawful though not commendable where defendant was sentenced for the
sale of marijuana "for an indeterminant term
as provided by law for the crime of selling a
narcotic drug as charged" despite the fact that
the statutory basis for the sentence provided
for imprisonment "from five years to life." State
v. Cowan, 26 Utah 2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d 898, Criminal
law§ 542.
C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1468.

Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e=> 991(3),
1208(9).

77-18-5. Reports by courts and prosecuting
Board of Pardons and Parole.

attorneys

to

In cases where an indeterminate sentence is imposed, the judge and
prosecuting attorney may, within 30 days, mail a statement to the Board of
Pardons and Parole setting forth the term for which the prisoner ought to be
imprisoned together with any information which might aid the board in
passing on the application for termination or commutation of the sentence or
for parole or pardon.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1994, ch. 13, § 27.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amend-

ment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "Board
of Pardons and Parole" for "Board of Pardons."
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Judgment of death - Defendant
method - Time of selection.

to select

When a person is convicted of a capital offense and the judgment of death
has been imposed, the defendant is entitled to select, at the time of sentencing,
either a firing squad or a lethal intravenous injection as the method of
execution. If the defendant does not indicate a preference at that time to the
court, the judgment of death shall be executed by lethal intravenous injection.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-5.5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 112, § 1; 1988, ch. 90, § 1.

77-18-6.

Judgment to pay fine or restitution
lien.

constitutes

a

A judgment which orders the payment of a fine or payment of restitution to
a victim pursuant to Section 76-3-201 constitutes a lien when recorded in the
judgment docket and $hall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules
as a judgment for money in a civil action.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-6, enacted by L
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1983, ch. 262, § 4.
Cross-References. - Enforcement ofjudg-

ment of fine and costs,§ 77-19-1.
Judgment liens, § 78-22-1.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Fines § 15.
Key Numbers. - Fines cS=>3.

77-18-7.

Costs imposed on defendant - Restrictions.

Unless specifically authorized by statute, a defendant shall not be required
to pay court costs in a criminal case either as a part of a sentence or as a
condition of probation or dismissal.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-7, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.- 20Am. Jur. 2d Costs§ 100.
Key Numbers. - Costs cS=>292.

77-18-8.

Fine not paid - Commitment.

When a defendant is sentenced to pay a fine in addition to a jail or a prison
sentence and the judgment is that the jail or prison sentence be suspended
upon payment of the fine, the service of the jail or prison sentence shall satisfy
the judgment. If a defendant fails to pay the fine and thereafter the court finds
that the defendant failed to make a good faith effort to pay the fine, the court
may, after a hearing, order the execution of the suspended jail or prison
sentence. If a defendant is sentenced to pay a fine only or is sentenced to jail
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or prison and a fine, with neither suspended, he shall not later be committed
to jail for failure to pay the fine.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-8, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

Cross-References.
76-3-301.

-

Fines, §§ 76-3-201,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§§ 617 to 621.
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Fines § 11.
A.L.R. - Indigency of offender as affecting

validity of imprisonment as alternative to payment of fine, 31 A.L.R.3d 926.
11, 12.
Key Numbers. - Fines

77-18-9. Definitions .
.AJ3
used in this chapter:
(1) "Administrative finding'' means a decision upon a question of fact
reached by an administrative agency following an administrative hearing
or other procedure satisfying the requirements of due process.
(2) "Certificate of eligibility" means a document issued by the division
stating that the criminal record which is the subject of a petition for
expungement is eligible for expungement.
(3) "Conviction" means judgment by a criminal court on a verdict or
finding of guilty after trial, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere.
(4) "Division" means the Law Enforcement and Technical Services
Division of the Department of Public Safety.
(5) "Expungement" means the sealing or destruction of a criminal
record, including records of the investigation, arrest, detention, or conviction of the petitioner.
(6) "Jurisdiction" means an area of authority.
(7) "Petitioner" means a person seeking expungement under this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-9, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 143, § 1.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 143

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Comment, Arrest
Record Expungement - A Function of the
Criminal Court, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 381.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law§ 1020.
A.L.R. - Right of exonerated arrestee to
have fingerprints, photographs or other criminal identification or arrest records expunged or
restricted, 46 A.L.R.3d 900.

Judicial expunction of criminal record of convicted adult, 11 A.L.R.4th 956.
Expunction of federal arrest records in absence of conviction, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 652.
Effect of expungement of conviction on
§ 241(a)(4), (11) of Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 uses § 1251(a)(4), (11)),
making aliens deportable for crimes involving
moral turpitude or drugs, 98 A.L.R. Fed. 750.
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Petition - Expungement of records of arrest,
investigation, and detention - Eligibility conditions - No filing fee.

(1) A person who has been arrested with or without a warrant may petition
the court in which the proceeding occurred or, if there were no court proceedings, any court in the jurisdiction where the arrest occurred, for an order
expunging any and all records of arrest, investigation, and detention which
may have been made in the case, subject to the following conditions:
(a) at least 30 days have passed since the arrest for which expungement
is sought;
(b) there have been no intervening arrests; and
(c) one of the following occurred:
(i) the person was released without the filing of formal charges;
(ii) proceedings against the person were dismissed;
(iii) the person was discharged without a conviction and no charges
were refiled within 30 days;
(iv) the person was acquitted at trial; or
(v) the record of any proceedings against the person has been
sealed under Section 77-18-13.
(2) (a) A person seeking expungement under Subsection (1) may petition
the court for expungement before the expiration of the 30 days required by
Subsection (l)(a) if he believes extraordinary circumstances exist.
(b) A court may order expungement if the court finds that the petitioner
is eligible for relief under this subsection and in the interest of justice the
order should be issued prior to the expiration of the 30-day period required
by Subsection (l)(a).
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection 21-1-5(8), there is no fee for a petition filed
under Subsection (2).
(4) If the court finds that the petitioner is eligible for relief under this
section, it shall issue an order granting the expungement.
(5) No filing fees or other administrative charges shall be assessed against
a successful petitioner under this section.
(6) A person who has received expungement of an arrest under this section
may respond to any inquiry as though the arrest did not occur, unless
otherwise provided by law.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-10, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 143, § 2.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 143
became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. - Expungement and

sealing ofrecords, Rule 4-207, Rules of Judicial
Administration.
Expungement of juvenile court record, § 783a-56; Rule 7-308, Rules of Judicial Administration.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Due process rights.
Necessity of conviction.
Professional licensing hearing.
Termination of teacher.
Due process rights.
Presentation of testimony that violated the

Utah expungement statute implicated plaintiff's procedural due process right to a fair,
impartial hearing. Ambus v. Granite Bd. of
Educ., 975 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1992), aff'd as
modified, 995 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1993).

Necessity of conviction.
Since there was nothing in the record to show
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that the defendant had in fact been convicted of
any offense, an appellate court could presume
that the trial court acted properly in denying
the defendant's motion for expungement, since
the remedy was formerly only available after a
conviction.State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307 (Utah
1985).

Professional licensing hearing.
Those persons who have access to the sealed
record, who testified at the previous criminal
hearings, or whose testimony is bolstered by
reference to the sealed record cannot be allowed
to "recreate" the record in proceedings after the
record has been expunged. Ambus v. State Bd.
of Educ., 800 P.2d 811 (Utah 1990).

77-18-11

Termination of teacher.
A school district properly could rely on any
information concerning a teacher's conduct
that it received before the expungement order
became effective, and after the expungement
order it was entitled to present at a due process
hearing the information on which it relied in
making the initial decision to terminate the
teacher. The district, however, was not entitled
to present testimony by the arresting officer or
paid informant at a new hearing held after the
police department had received the expungement order. Am bus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 97 5
F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1992), aff'd as modified,
995 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1993).

77-18-11. Petition - Expungement of conviction
tificate of eligibility - Notice -Written
tion - Objections - Hearing.

- Cerevalua-

(1) A person convicted of a crime may petition the convicting court for an
expungement of the record of conviction.
(2) The court may require receipt of a certificate of eligibility issued by the
division under Section 77-18-12.
(3) If the court does not require a certificate of eligibility, the court shall
make its own findings concerning the petitioner's eligibility for expungement
under Section 77-18-12.
(4) The petition and certificate of eligibility, if required by the court, or the
petition and the court's findings as provided under Subsection (3), shall be filed
with the court and served upon the prosecuting attorney.
(5) A victim shall receive notice of a petition for expungement if, prior to the
entry of an expungement order, the victim or, in the case of a minor or a person
who is incapacitated or deceased, the victim's next of kin or authorized
representative, submits a written and signed request for notice to the office of
the Department of Corrections in the judicial district in which the crime
occurred or judgment was entered.
(6) The Department of Corrections shall serve notice of the expungement
request by first-class mail to the victim at the most recent address of record on
file with the department. The notice shall include a copy of the petition,
certificate of eligibility, and statutes and rules applicable to the petition.
(7) The court in its discretion may request a written evaluation by Adult
Parole and Probation of the Department of Corrections, except that a written
evaluation shall be required for any conviction of a sexual offense under Title
76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses Against the Person, and Title 76,
Chapter 5a, Sexual Exploitation of Children, or of any sexual act against a
minor.
(a) The evaluation shall include a recommendation concerning the
petition for expungement.
(b) If expungement is recommended, the evaluation shall include certification that the petitioner has completed all requirements of sentencing
and probation or parole and state any rationale that would support or
refute consideration for expungement.
(c) The conclusions and recommendations contained in the evaluation
shall be provided to the petitioner and the prosecuting attorney.
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(8) If the prosecuting attorney or a victim submits a written objection to the
court concerning the petition within 30 days after service of the notice, or if the
petitioner objects to the conclusions and recommendations in the evaluation
within 15 days after receipt of the conclusions and recommendations, the court
shall set a date for a hearing and notify the prosecuting attorney for the
jurisdiction, the petitioner, and the victim of the date set for the hearing.
(9) Any person who has relevant information about the petitioner may
testify at the hearing.
(10) If an objection is not received under Subsection (6), the expungement
may be granted without a hearing.
(11) A court may not expunge a conviction of a:
(a) capital felony;
(b) first degree felony;
(c) second degree forcible felony; or
(d) any sexual act against a minor.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-11, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 143, § 3.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 143

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of pardon and expungement.
-Certification of police officers.

Effect of pardon and expungement.
Witness may not be impeached on a prior
conviction of a crime if the record of the conviction has been expunged. State v. Jones, 581
P.2d 141 (Utah 1978).
Since 1980 amendment, a judicial pardon
and expungement under former§ 77-18-2 was
not a complete and unqualified expungement

77-18-12.

that erases the prior conviction sufficiently to
relieve person from firearm disabilities imposed by federal law as a result of the prior
conviction. Thompson v. Department of Treas.,
557 F. Supp. 158 (D. Utah 1982).

-Certification
of police officers.
Division of Peace Officer Standards and
Training, a division of the Utah Department of
Public Safety, could not consider convictions
expunged in deciding whether to grant or deny
certification to an individual. Doe v. Utah Dep't
of Pub. Safety, 782 P.2d 489 (Utah 1989).

Grounds for denial of certificate of eligibilityEffect of prior convictions.

(1) If a certificate of eligibility is required by the court, the division shall
issue a certificate of eligibility to a petitioner seeking to obtain expungement
for a criminal record unless prior to issuing a certificate of eligibility the
division finds, through records of a governmental agency, including national
criminal data bases that:
(a) the conviction for which expungement is sought is a capital felony,
first degree felony, second degree forcible felony, or a conviction involving
a sexual act against a minor;
(b) the petitioner's record includes two or more convictions for any type
of offense which would be classified as a felony under Utah law, not arising
out of a single criminal episode, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the
convictions occurred;
(c) the petitioner has previously obtained expungement in any jurisdiction of a crime which would be classified as a felony in Utah;
624
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(d) the petitioner has previously obtained expungement in any jurisdiction of two or more convictions which would be classified as misdemeanors
in Utah;
(e) the petitioner was convicted in any jurisdiction, subsequent to the
conviction for which expungement is sought and within the time periods
as provided in Subsection (2), of a crime which would be classified in Utah
as a felony, misdemeanor, or infraction;
(f) the person has a combination of three or more convictions not arising
out of a single criminal episode including any conviction for an offense
which would be classified under Utah law as a class B or class A
misdemeanor or as a felony, including any misdemeanor and felony
convictions previously expunged, regardless of the jurisdiction in which
the conviction or expungement occurred; or
(g) a proceeding involving a crime is pending or being instituted in any
jurisdiction against the petitioner.
(2) A conviction shall not be included for purposes of Subsection (l)(e), and
no conviction shall be considered for expungement until, after the petitioner's
release from incarceration, parole, or probation, whichever occurs last, at least
the following period of time has elapsed:
(a) seven years in the case of a felony;
(b) six years in the case of an alcohol-related traffic offense under Title
41;
(c) five years in the case of a class A misdemeanor; or
(d) three years in the case of any other misdemeanor or infraction under
Title 76.
(3) A petitioner who would not be eligible to receive a certificate of eligibility
under Subsection (l)(b), (c), (d), or (f) may receive a certificate of eligibility for
an additional expungement if at least 20 years have elapsed since the last of
any of the following:
(a) release from incarceration, parole, or probation relating to the most
recent conviction; and
(b) any other conviction which would have prevented issuance of a
certificate of eligibility under Subsection (l)(e).
History: C. 1953, 77-18-12, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 143, § 4,
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 143

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

77-18-13. Hearing - Standard of proof - Exception.
(1) The court shall review the petition, certificate of eligibility, if required,
and any written evaluation and receive any testimony or writing submitted by
a victim or prosecuting attorney.
(2) The court shall issue a certificate to the petitioner, stating the court's
finding that the petition and certificate of eligibility, if required, are sufficient
and the statutory requirements for expungement have been satisfied unless
there is clear and convincing evidence to persuade the court that it would be
contrary to the interest of the public to grant a requested expungement.
(3) Except as otherwise provided by law, a person receiving expungement of
a conviction under this section may respond to any inquiry as though the
conviction did not occur.
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History: C. 1953, 77-18-13, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 143, § 5.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 143

77-18-14.

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Order to expunge - Distribution of order
Redaction - Receipt of order - Administrative
proceedings - Division requirements.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, upon approval of a petition
for expungement, the court shall enter an order to expunge all records in the
petitioner's case which are in the custody of that court or in the custody of any
other court, agency, or official.
(2) The petitioner shall be responsible for service of the order of
expungement to all affected state, county, and local entities, agencies, and
officials including the court, arresting agency, booking agency, Department of
Corrections, and the division.
(3) The division shall forward a copy of the expungement order to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(4) Any state, county, or local entity, agency, or official receiving an
expungement order shall expunge all records pertaining to the order except
that the entity, agency, or official may petition the court to modify its order to
permit redaction of the petitioner's name to avoid destruction or sealing of the
records in whole or in part.
(5) No state, county, or local entity, agency, or official may, after receiving
service of an expungement order, divulge information contained in the expunged record.
(6) (a) An order of expungement shall not restrict an agency's use or
dissemination ofrecords in its ordinary course of business until the agency
has received service of a copy of the order.
(b) Any action taken by an agency after issuance of the order but prior
to the agency's receipt of a copy of the order may not be invalidated by the
order.
(7) An order of expungement may not:
(a) terminate or invalidate any pending administrative proceedings or
actions of which the petitioner had notice according to the records of the
administrative body prior to issuance of the expungement order;
(b) affect the enforcement of any order or findings issued by an
administrative body pursuant to its lawful authority prior to issuance of
the expungement order; or
(c) remove any evidence relating to the petitioner including records of
arrest, which the administrative body has used or may use in these
proceedings.
(8) The division shall provide the petitioner with a list of the agencies
affected by this subsection with clear written directions regarding the requirements of this section.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-14, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 143, § 6.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 143

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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77-18-15. Retention
cies.

of expunged

77-18-16

records - Fee -Agen-

(1) The division shall keep, index, and maintain all expunged records of
arrests and convictions.
(2) The di vision may charge a petitioner a reasonable fee for processing an
expungement order under Section 63-38-3.
(3) Employees of the division may not divulge any information contained in
its index to any person or agency without a court order, except to the following:
(a) the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(b) the Peace Officer Standards and Training;
(c) federal authorities, unless prohibited by federal law;
(d) the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing; and
(e) the State Office of Education.
(4) A person whose records are released under Subsection (3) shall be given
a reasonable opportunity by the recipient agency to challenge and explain any
information in the records and to challenge the relevancy of that information
before a final determination is made by the agency.
(5) A court may permit inspection or release of an expunged record only
upon petition by the person who is the subject of the record and only to the
persons named in the petition.
(6) (a) For judicial sentencing, a court may order any records sealed under
this section to be opened and admitted into evidence.
(b) The records are confidential and are available for inspection only by
the court, parties, counsel for the parties, and any other person who is
authorized by the court to inspect them.
(c) At the end of the action or proceeding, the court shall order the
records sealed again.
(7) Records released under this section are classified as protected under
Subsection 63-2-304(8) and are accessible only as provided under Title 63,
Chapter 2, Part 2, Access to Records.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-15, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 143, § 7.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 143
became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. - Board of Pardons and
Parole, § 77-27-2.

Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing, § 58-1-103.
Peace Officer Standards and Training Division, § 53-6-103.

77-18-16. Penalty.
Any person who willfully violates any prohibition in this chapter is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-16, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 143, § 8.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 143

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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77-18-17.

Retroactive

application.

The provisions of Sections 77-18-9 through 77-18-17 apply retroactively to
all arrests and convictions regardless of the date on which the arrests were
made or convictions were entered.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-17, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 143, § 9.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 143

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

CHAPTER 18a
THE APPEAL
Section
77-lSa-1.
77-18a-2.

Appeals - When proper.
Capital cases.

77-18a-1.

Appeals -When

proper.

(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence
when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal
would be in the interest of justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest.
History: C. 1953, 77-18a-1, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 7, § 10.
Compiler's
Notes. This chapter

recodifies Subsections (2), (3), and (9) of former
Section 77-35-26, which is Rule 26 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appealability.
Appeal by defendant.
Appeal by prosecution.
Arrest of judgment.
Bind over orders.
Death penalty cases.
"Dismissal."

Double jeopardy.
Habeas corpus ruling.
Oral statements from bench.
Suppression orders.
Appealability.
To determine whether an appeal falls within
one of the enumerated grounds, the appellate
court looks to the substance of the ruling and
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not to the label attached by a trial judge. State
v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App.),
aff'd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).
Appeal by defendant.
A purported second judgment and sentence,
which was clearly an attempt to render a judgment in criminal proceeding which if valid
would have affected defendant's rights, was
appealable. State v. Alexander, 15 Utah 2d 14,
386 P.2d 411 (1963).
Denial of motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is a "final" judgment; rights protected by the double jeopardy guarantee necessitate review on appeal before a second trial if
defendant is to enjoy full protection of the
clause. State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah
1979).
Appeal by prosecution.
District court's judgment, discharging defendant in criminal prosecution and releasing his
bail, entered on plea to court's jurisdiction, was
final judgment from which state might appeal.
State v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59 P. 553 (1899).
State had right of appeal from judgment
discharging defendant, in prosecution for felony, on ground that information did not state
facts sufficient to constitute public offens!;l.
State v. McKenna, 24 Utah 317, 67 P. 815
(1902).
The state had no right to appeal sentence
imposed upon defendant since the imposition of
sentence was part of the judgment, and not an
order made after judgment. State v. Kelbach,
569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977).
Former section did not authorize the prosecution to appeal an acquittal, no matter how
overwhelming the evidence against the defendant may be. State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d
1061 (Utah 1983).
Where dismissal of charge was based. on trial
court's construction of the applicable law before
the court ruled on the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, the ruling was, in effect, a
"finaljudgment of dismissal" and therefore was
appealable even though the ruling was made at
the close of all the evidence. State v.
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983).
The state may not, following a pretrial ruling
suppressing some state's evidence, request dismissal of a criminal case in order to avoid the
discretionary appeal provisions and to obtain
an appeal of right. State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d
223 (Utah 1985).
A trial court's dismissal of a case on the
ground that the prosecution has not proved an
element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt is in substance an acquittal and therefore
is not appealable. State v. Chugg, 749 P.2d 1279
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
State could not appeal an order granting
defendant a new trial after he moved to arrest

77-18a-1

judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial
where the trial court did not, in substance,
grant an arrest of judgment but a new trial.
State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
An appeal by the state properly lies only from
the order of dismissal and does not lie from the
denial of a motion for new trial. State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Arrest of judgment.
A trial court's ruling was an arrest of judgment and not an acquittal where the trial court
found that the facts proved did not constitute a
crime because the defendant, a general partner,
could not have committed theft by taking partnership property. Although the trial court's order was also labeled an acquittal, the order was
not based on a finding of insufficient evidence.
Thus, the state had a right to appeal. State v.
Larsen, 834 P.2d 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Birtd over orders.
Defendant, a juvenile whose preliminary examination was conducted in district court
rather than in circuit court, was not denied the
right to review of the bind over order by a
superior court, since he had the same right to
seek review as does any other criminal defendant. State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah
1985).
Death penalty cases.
While Utah law does not compel a defendant
sentenced to death to go through every procedure that a defendant might voluntarily invoke, the law does require one automatic appeal even when "the defendant has chosen not
to pursue his own appeal." State v. Holland, 777
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989).
"Dismissal."
The language "a final judgment of dismissal"
refers to dismissals where the trial court construes the applicable law before ruling on the
sufficiency of the evidence to convict and before
a final judgment. State v. Amador, 804 P.2d
1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
When a motion to suppress evidence is renewed following closing arguments and is
granted, the order granting the motion is an
acquittal and not a "dismissal" as that term is
used in this section and Utah R. Crim. P.
26(3)(a), and is not subject to appeal by the
state. State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990), cert. denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah
1991).
Ruling labeled as a "dismissal" was not appealable because the judge's decision came after trial of the issues involved and was a ruling
on the sufficiency of the evidence. State v.
Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App.), aff'd,
852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).
Trial court's ruling at the end of the state's
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case that "the state failed to present sufficient
evidence to make out a prima facie case on any
of the remaining counts of the information" and
dismissal with prejudice was an acquittal and
not a dismissal. State v. Jackson, 857 P.2d 267
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Oral statements from bench.
Oral statements made from the bench are not
the judgment of the case and therefore are not
appealable. State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885
(Utah 1978).
Suppression orders.
An appellate court will review suppression
orders on appeal from a dismissal only where
the trial court certifies that the evidence suppressed substantially impairs the prosecution's
case. The Supreme Court requires the state to
request dismissal with prejudice to obtain review of suppression orders on an appeal of right
from a dismissal. State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528
(Utah 1993).

Double jeopardy.
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss based
upon former jeopardy defense was not a final
judgment from which an appeal could be taken.
State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978).
Habeas corpus ruling.
District court's ruling on habeas corpus petition was final, appealable judgment. Winnovich
v. Emery, 33 Utah 345, 93 P. 988 (1908).

COLLATERALREFERENCES
A.L.R. - When criminal case becomes moot
so as to preclude review of or attack on conviction or sentence, 9 A.L.R.3d 462.
Appealability of orders or rulings, prior to
final judgment in criminal case, as to accused's
mental competency, 16 A.L.R.3d 714.
Court's presentence inquiry as to, or consideration of, accused's intention to appeal as
error, 64 A.L.R.3d 1226.
Validity and effect of criminal defendant's
express waiver of right to appeal as part of
negotiated plea agreement, 89 A.L.R.3d 864.
Appeal by state of order granting new trial in
criminal case, 95 A.L.R.3d 596.
Judgment favorable to convicted criminal defendant in subsequent civil action arising out of

77-lSa-2.

same offense as ground for reversal of conviction, 96 A.L.R.3d 1174.
Waiver or estoppel in incompetent legal representation cases, 2 A.L.R.4th 807.
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding appellate and
postconviction remedies, 15 A.L.R.4th 582.
Presence of alternate juror in jury room as
ground for reversal of state criminal conviction,
15 A.L.R.4th 1127.
Appealability of order suspending imposition
or execution of sentence, 51 A.L.R.4th 939.
Abatement effects of accused's death before
appellate review of federal criminal conviction,
80 A.L.R. Fed. 446.

Capital cases.

After the resolution of an initial appeal of a capital case when the sentence
of death has been imposed, a subsequent appeal may not be entertained by any
court and a stay of execution of the sentence may not be granted when the
appeal does not raise any new matter not previously resolved or when the new
matter could have been raised at the previous appeal.
History: C. 1953, 77-lSa-2, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 7, § 11.

CHAPTER19
THE EXECUTION
Section
77-19-1.
77-19-2.
77-19-3.

Judgment for fine or costs - Enforcement.
Judgment of imprisonment Commitment.
Special release from city or county
jail - Purposes.

Section
77-i9-4.
77-19-5.
77-19-6.
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Special release from city or county
jail - Conditions and limitations.
Special release from city or county
jail - Revocation.
Judgment of death - Warrant -
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THE EXECUTION
Section
77-19-7.
77-19-8.
77-19-9.
77-19-10.

Delivery of warrant- Determination of execution time.
Judgment of death - Statement
to Board of Pardons and Parole.
Judgment of death, when suspended, and by whom.
Judgment of death not executed
- Order for execution.
Judgment of death - Location
and procedures for execution.

Section
77-19-11.
77-19-12.
77-19-13.

Who may be present - Photographic and recording equipment.
Return upon death warrant.
Incompetency or pregnancy of person sentenced to death - Procedures.

77-19-1. Judgment for fine or costs - Enforcement.
If the judgment is for a fine or costs when allowed by statute and the fine is
not paid as ordered by the court, execution or garnishment may be issued as on
a judgment in a civil action. The prosecuting attorney, upon written request of
the court clerk, shall effectuate collection through execution or garnishment
when the fine or costs have not been paid as ordered by the court.
History: C. 1953, 77-19-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. - Defense costs in
criminal actions, convicted defendant may be

ordered to pay, §§ 77-32a-1 to 77-32a-14.
Judgment of fine constitutes a lien,§ 77-186.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Enforcement of fine.
Judgment of fine, rendered in criminal case,
was enforceable by imprisonment only when it
stood alone and was not coupled with distinct
sentence of imprisonment. Roberts v. Howells,
22 Utah 389, 62 P. 892 (1900).
Where, in criminal case, there was judgment
of imprisonment and also judgment of fine, fine

was not enforceable by imprisonment but was
collectible only by execution as in civil case.
Roberts v. Howells, 22 Utah 389, 62 P. 892
(1900).
Judgment for the fine could not be enforced
by imprisonment, but only by execution. Reese
v. Olsen, 44 Utah 318, 139 P. 941 (1914).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Fines § 32.
Key Numbers. - Fines <S=>6.

77-19-2. Judgment of imprisonment

- Commitment.

If the judgment is for imprisonment, the sheriff of the county or other
appropriate custodial officer designated by the court shall, upon receipt of a
certified copy of the judgment, deliver the defendant to the warden of the state
prison or keeper of the jail. Such custodial officer shall also deliver a certified
copy of the judgment and take a receipt from the warden or keeper of the jail
for the defendant and return it to the court.
History: C. 1953, 77-19-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. - Delivery of offender

for incarceration, § 64-13-18.
Sheriff to convey prisoners to prison, § 1722-3.

631

I

77-19-3

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Unlawful sentence.
Where the law prescribed the place of imprisonment, the court was without jurisdiction to
direct imprisonment elsewhere. Frankey v.

Patten, 75 Utah 231, 284 P. 318 (1929), and
cases therein cited; Ex parte Folck, 102 Utah
470, 132 P.2d 130 (1942).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. -

77-19-3.

Prisons e=> 13.

Special release from city or county jail -r Purposes.

Any person sentenced to a term in any city or county jail may, pursuant to
order of the sentencing judge, be released from jail during those hours which
are reasonable and necessary to accomplish any of the following purposes:
(1) Working at his employment;
(2) Performing essential household duties;
(3) Attending an educational institution;
(4) Obtaining necessary medical treatment; or
(5) Any other proper purpose the court may order.
History: C. 1953, 77-19-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. - Sentencing, § 76-3201 et seq.

77-19-4.

Work release from state prison,§ 64-13-14.5.

Special release from city or county jailtions and limitations.

Condi-

All released prisoners, while absent from the jail, are in the custody of the
jailer and subject at any time to being returned to jail, if good cause appears for
so doing. The judge shall specify the terms and conditions of the release time
which may include, but are not limited to the following:
(1) The prisoner may be required to pay all monies earned from
employment during the jail term to those persons he is legally responsible
to support; or
(2) He may be required to pay a reasonable amount for the expenses of
his maintenance in the jail but may be permitted to retain sufficient
money to pay his costs of transportation, meals, and other incidental and
necessary expenses.
During all hours when the prisoner is not serving the function for which he
is awarded release time, he shall be confined to jail. The prisoner shall be
responsible for obtaining his own transportation to and from the place where
he performs the function for which he is released.
History: C. 1953, 77-19-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
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77-19-7

77-19-5. Special release from city or county jail - Revocation.
The judge may, for good cause, revoke any release time previously awarded,
and shall notify the prisoner that, if he makes written request, a hearing shall
be afforded to him to challenge the revocation.
History: C. 1953, 77-19-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-19-6. Judgment of death
Warrant - Delivery
warrant - Determination of execution time.

of

(1) When judgment of death is rendered, a warrant, signed by the judge and
attested by the clerk under the seal of the court, shall be drawn and delivered
to the sheriff of the county where the conviction is had. The sheriff shall deliver
the warrant and a certified copy of the judgment to the executive director of the
Department of Corrections or his designee at the time of delivering the
defendant to the custody of the Department of Corrections.
(2) The warrant shall state the conviction, the judgment, the method of
execution, and the appointed day the judgment is to be executed, which may
not be fewer than 30 days nor more than 60 days from the date of issuance of
the warrant. The Department of Corrections shall determine the hour, within
the appointed day, at which the judgment is to be executed.
History: C. 1953, 77-19-6, enacted by L.
1980,ch.15,§ 2;1983,ch.112,§
2;1988,ch.
190, § 2.
Cross-References. - Certified copy of sen-

tence to be delivered to Department, § 64-1318.
Sheriff to convey prisoners to prison, § 1722-3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Time of execution of sentence.
Time limitations were applicable to resentencing of prisoner after unsuccessful appeal
and denial of commutation by Board of Pardons; sentence to be executed within fourteen
days was invalid. Seyboldt v. District Court, 66

Utah 15, 239 P. 476 (1925).
The limitation of sixty days was provided so
as to prevent any court from fixing a time so far
into the future that the ends of justice might be
defeated. State v. Green, 88 Utah 491, 55 P.2d
1324 (1936).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§§ 609, 610.
C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1591.
A.L.R. - Effect of abolition of capital pun-

ishment [in certain instances] on procedural
rules governing crimes punishable by death post-Furman decisions, 71 A.L.R.3d 453.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e:=, 999(2).

77-19-7. Judgment of death Pardons and Parole.

Statement

to Board of

The judge of a court where a judgment of death was had shall, immediately
after the conviction, transmit to the chair of the Board of Pardons and Parole
a statement of the conviction and judgment and a summary of the evidence
given at trial.
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History: C. 1953, 77-19-7, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15,§ 2;1994,ch. 13,§ 28.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amend-

77-19-8. Judgment
whom.

ment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "chair"
for "chairman" and "Board of Pardons and Parole" for "Board of Pardons."

of death, when suspended,

and by

A judge, tribunal, or officer, other than the governor or the Board of Pardons
and Parole, may not suspend the execution of a judgment of death, except:
(1) a temporary stay of judgment of ,death may issue by a court of
competent jurisdiction when the judgment is appealed, automatically
reviewed, or subjected to collateral attack in a post conviction proceeding;
or
(2) in cases of suspected incompetency or pregnancy of the defendant,
execution may be temporarily suspended by the executive director of the
Department of Corrections or his designee under Section 77-19-13.
History: C. 1953, 77-19-8, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1988, ch. 190, § 3; 1994, ch.
13, § 29.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amend-

ment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "Board
of Pardons and Parole" for "Board of Pardons"
and made a stylistic change in the introductory
language of the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Suspension by court.
Writ of prohibition was issued to restrain
district court from proceeding on petition by
defendant's mother for examination into sanity

of defendant who had been condemned to death
since court had no jurisdiction to suspend death
sentence. State ex rel. Johnson v. Alexander, 87
Utah 376, 49 P.2d 408 (1935).

COLLATERALREFERENCES
C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 1547.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law ,s;, 1001.

77-19-9.

Judgment of death not executed
execution.

-

Order for

(1) Iffor any reason a judgment of death has not been executed and remains
in force, the court where the conviction was had, on application of the
prosecuting attorney, shall order the defendant to be brought before it or, ifhe
is at large, issue a warrant for his apprehension.
(2) When the defendant is brought before the court, it shall inquire into the
facts and, ifno legal reason exists against the execution of judgment, the court
shall make an order requiring the executive director of the Department of
Corrections or his designee to ensure that the judgment is executed on a
specified day, not fewer than 30 nor more than 60 days thereafter, at an hour
determined by the Department of Corrections.
(3) The court shall also draw and have delivered another warrant under
Section 77-19-6.
History: C. 1953, 77-19-9, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1988, ch. 190, § 4.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
an infonnal hearing and investigation at which
witnesses qualified in medicine, psychiatry and
psychology could be examined touching defendant's mental condition, so that the judge
might be further advised with respect to defendant's mental condition, should the sheriff seek
his concurrence in a determination to call a jury
to try issue of defendant's sanity. State v.
Green, 88 Utah 491, 55 P.2d 1324 (1936).

ANALYSIS

Effect of reprieve or certificate of probable
cause.
Infonnal hearing.
Time limitations.

Effect of reprieve or certificate of probable ca\ise.
A judgment or sentence was not set aside or
invalidated by either the issuance of certificate
ofprobable cause or by governor's reprieve. The
only effect was one of delay, making necessary
the fixing of another date when the judgment
must be executed. State v. Green, 88 Utah 491,
55 P.2d 1324 (1936).

Time limitations.
Time limitations specified in former § 7736-5 were applicable to former§ 77-36-15; and
order for execution of prisoner within fourteen
days was invalid, notwithstanding prior unsuccessful appeal and denial of application for
commutation of sentence. Seyboldt v. District
Court, 66 Utah 15, 239 P. 476 (1925).

Informal hearing.
When defendant was brought before the
court, the court could on its own accord conduct

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.§ 611.

C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1592.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law cS= 1003.

21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law

77-19-10. Judgment of death - Location and procedures
for execution.
(1) The executive director of the Department of Corrections or his designee
shall ensure that the method of judgment of death specified in the warrant is
carried out at a secure correctional facility operated by the Department of
Corrections at an hour determined by the Department of Corrections on the
date specified in the warrant.
(2) If the judgment of death is to be carried out by shooting, the executive
director of the Department of Corrections or his designee shall select a
five-person firing squad of peace officers.
(3) If the judgment of death is to be carried out by lethal intravenous
injection, the executive director of the Department of Corrections or his
designee shall select two or more persons trained in accordance with accepted
medical practices to administer intravenous injections, who shall each administer a continuous intravenous injection, one of which shall be of a lethal
quantity of sodium thiopental or other equally or more effective substance
sufficient to cause death. Death shall be pronounced by a licensed physician
according to accepted medical standards.
(4) Compensation for members of a firing squad or persons administering
intravenous injections shall be in an amount determined by the director of the
Division of Finance.
(5) The Department of Corrections shall adopt and enforce rules governing
procedures for the execution of judgments of death.
History: C. 1953, 77-19-10, enacted by L.
1983,ch. 112,§ 3; 1985,ch.212,§ 19;1988,
ch. 190, § 5.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws

1983, ch. 112, § 3 repealed former § 77-19-10
(L. 1980, ch. 15, § 2), relating to execution of
the death penalty by shooting, and enacted
present§ 77-19-10.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.
Execution by shooting does not violate establishment clause ofFirstAmendment nor does it
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment of the

United States Constitution.
Andrews v.
Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408 (D. Utah 1984), aff'd,
802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 919, 108 S. Ct. 1091, 99 L. Ed. 2d 253
(1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - The Courts, the Constitution and Capital Punishment, 1968 Utah
L. Rev. 201. '
Due Process Standard of Jury Impartiality
Precludes Death-Qualification of Jurors in

77-19-11.

Capital Cases, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 154.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. J ur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 598.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law <S=a1219.

Who may be present
cording equipment.

(1)
shall
(2)
tions

-

Photographic

and re-

The executive director of the Department of Corrections or his designee
cause a physician to attend the execution.
At the discretion of the executive director of the Department of Correcor his designee, the following persons may attend the execution:
(a) the prosecuting attorney, or his designated deputy, of the county in
which the defendant committed the offense for which he is being executed;
(b) no more than two law enforcement officials from the county in which
the defendant committed the offense for which he is being executed;
(c) the attorney general or his designated deputy; and
(d) religious representatives, friends, or relatives designated by the
defendant, not exceeding a total of five persons.
(3) The persons enumerated in Subsection (2) may not be required to attend,
nor may any of them attend as a matter of right.
(4) The executive director of the Department of Corrections or his designee
shall permit the attendance at the execution of a total of nine members of the
press and broadcast news media named by the executive director of the
Department of Corrections in accordance with rules of the Department of
Corrections, provided that the selected news media members serve as a pool for
other members of the news media as a condition of attendance.
(5) (a) Photographic or recording equipment is not permitted at the execution site until the execution is completed, the body is removed, and the site
has been restored to an orderly condition. However, the physical arrangements for the execution may not be disturbed.
(b) A violation of this subsection is a class B misdemeanor.
(6) All persons in attendance are subject to reasonable search as a condition
of attendance.
(7) (a) The following persons may also attend the execution:
(i) staff as determined necessary for the execution by the executive
director of the Department of Corrections or his designee; and
(ii) no more than three correctional officials from other states that
are preparing for executions, but no more than two correctional
officials may be from any one state, as designated by the executive
director of the Department of Corrections or his designee.
(b) Any person younger than 18 years of age may not attend.
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(8) The Department of Corrections shall adopt rules governing the attendance of persons at the execution.
History: C. 1953, 77-19-11, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1985, ch. 212, § 20; 1988,
ch. 190, § 6.

77-19-12.

Return upon death warrant.

After the execution, the executive director of the Department of Corrections
or his designee shall make a return upon the death warrant, showing the time,
place, and manner in which it was executed.
History: C. 1953, 77-19-12, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1988, ch. 190, § 7.

77-19-13.

Incompetency
or pregnancy
tenced to death - Procedures.

of person

sen-

(1) If, after judgment of death, there is good reason to believe the defendant
is incompetent to proceed under this chapter, or is pregnant, the executive
director of the Department of Corrections or his designee shall immediately
give written notice to the court in which the judgment of death was rendered,
to the prosecuting attorney, and counsel for defendant. The judgment shall be
stayed pending further order of the court.
(2) (a) On receipt of the notice, the mental condition of the defendant shall
be examined under the provisions of Title 77, Chapter 15.
(b) If the defendant is found incompetent, the court shall immediately
transmit a certificate of the findings to the Board of Pardons and Parole
and enter an order for commitment under Title 77, Chapter 15. If the
defendant is found competent, the judge shall immediately transmit a
certificate of the findings to the Board of Pardons and Parole, and shall
draw and have delivered another warrant under Section 77-19-6, together
with a copy of the certificate of the findings. The warrant shall state an
appointed day on which the judgment is to be executed, which may not be
fewer than 30 nor more than 60 days from the date of the drawing of the
warrant, at an hour determined by the Department of Corrections.
(3) (a) If the court finds the defendant is pregnant, it shall immediately
transmit a certificate of the finding to the Board of Pardons and Parole and
to the executive director of the Department of Corrections or his designee,
and the court shall issue an order staying the execution of the judgment of
death during the pregnancy.
(b) When the court determines the defendant is no longer pregnant, it
shall immediately transmit a certificate of the finding to the Board of
Pardons and Parole and draw and have delivered another warrant under
Section 77-19-6, with a copy of the certificate of the finding. The warrant
shall state an appointed day on which the judgment is to be executed,
which may not be fewer than 30 nor more than 60 days from the date of the
drawing of the warrant.
History: C. 1953, 77-19-13, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1988, ch. 190, § 8; 1994, ch.
13, § 30.

Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "Board
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of Pardons and Parole" for "Board of Pardons"
throughout the section.

Cross-References. - Inquiry into sanity of
defendant, § 77-15-1 et seq.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.- 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§§ 122 to 128.
C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 1547.

Key Numbers. 1001.

Criminal Law

®"'

981,

CHAPTER20
BAIL
Section
77-20-1.
77-20-2.
77-20-3.
77-20-4.
77-20-5.
77-20-6.
77-20-7.
77-20-8.

77-20-1.

Right to bail - Denial of bail Hearing.
Issuance of order admitting to
bail and fixing amount.
Release on own recognizance Changing amount of bail.
Bail posted in cash or written
undertaking.
Qualifications of sureties Justification - Requirements
of undertaking.
Release on approval of undertaking.
Duration of liability on undertaking - Notices to sureties.
Grounds for detaining or releasing defendant on conviction
and prior to sentence.

Section
77-20-8.5.
77-20-9.
77-20-10.

77-20-11.

77-20-12.
77-20-13.

Sureties - Surrender of defendant - Arrest of defendant.
Disposition of forfeitures.
Grounds for detaining defendant while appealing his conviction - Conditions for release while on appeal.
Bail Bond Surety Licensing
Board - Establishment Appointment of members Terms.
Bail Bond Surety Licensing
Board - Duties.
Judicial Council - Rulemaking
authority.

Right to bail - Denial of bail - Hearing.

(1) A person charged with or arrested for a criminal offense shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, except if the person is charged with a:
(a) capital offense, when there is substantial evidence to support the
charge;
(b) felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to
support the current felony charge; or
(c) felony when there is substantial evidence to support the charge and
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person would
constitute a substantial danger to any other person or to the community,
or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court, if released on bail.
(2) Bail set or denied prior to bind over may be redetermined after bind over.
(3) An appeal may be taken from an order of any court denying bail to the
Supreme Court, which shall review the determination under Subsection (1).
History: C. 1953, 77-20-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1988, ch. 160, § 1; 1988
(2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 2; 1992, ch. 127, § 10.
Amendment Notes. - The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, rewrote Subsection (2) and added Subsection (3).

Cross-References. - Bail on habeas corpus
proceeding, § 78-35-2.
County bail commissioners,§§ 17-32-1 to 1732-4.
Excessive bail prohibited, Utah Const.,Art. I,
§ 9.
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as

Jumping bail criminal offense, § 76-8-312.
Municipal bail commissioners, §§ 10-3-920
to 10-3-922.

Right to bail, Utah Const., Art. I, § 8.
Rules of Evidence inapplicable to bail proceedings, Rules of Evidence, Rule 1101.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
witnesses and at which he may cross-examine
the state's witnesses. Defendant must be given
adequate notice to prepare for the hearing and,
at the hearing, the trial court may not revoke
bail unless the facts adduced by the state
furnish a reasonable basis for a jury finding of
a verdict of guilty of a capital crime. State v.
Kastanis, 848 P.2d 673 (Utah 1993).
Cited in State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

ANALYSIS

Hearing.
Cited.

Hearing.
Accused charged with a capital offense had
the rights to cross-examination and to present
his own witnesses at a bail hearing. Chynoweth
v. Larson, 572 P.2d 1081 (Utah 1977).
A defendant must be allowed a bail hearing,
at which he may present his own evidence and

COLLATERALREFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Comment, Roll v.
Larson: The Right to Bail in Capital Cases
After Furman v. Georgia, 1974 Utah L. Rev.
421.
Recent Developments in Utah Law - Statutory Enactments - Criminal Law, 1989 Utah
L. Rev. 349.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bail and

Recognizance§ 1 et seq.
C.J.S. - 8 C.J.S. Bail§§ 5 to 7, 18 to 23.
A.L.R. - Insanity of accused as affecting
right to bail in criminal case, 11 A.L.R.3d 1385.
Right of extraditee to bail after issuance of
governor's warrant and pending final disposition of habeas corpus claim, 13 A.L.R.5th 118.
Key Numbers. - Bail ®.> 39, 42, 43.

77-20-2. Issuance of order admitting
amount.

to bail and fixing

The order admitting to bail and fixing the amount thereof may be issued by
a magistrate having jurisdiction over the person arrested or jurisdiction over
the trial of the offense committed, or by any person authorized in writing by
the magistrate pending an appearance before a magistrate.
History: C. 1953, 77-20-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

Cross-References. - Excessive bail prohibited, Utah Const., Art. I, § 9.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Judicial act.
This section affirms judicial responsibility for
bail. Accordingly, since the setting of bail is a
judicial act, a justice of the peace is absolutely

immune from damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for any alleged violation of plaintiff's right to
bail. Edwards v. Hare, 682 F. Supp. 1528 (D.
Utah 1988).

COLLATERALREFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bail and
Recognizance §§ 73 to 81.
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C.J.S. - 8 C.J.S. Bail §§ 62, 66.
Key Numbers. - Bail ®.> 51.

77-20-3

77-20-3.
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Release on own
amount of bail.

recognizance

Changing

(1) Any person who may be admitted to bail may likewise be released on his
own recognizance in the discretion of the magistrate.
(2) After admitting the defendant to bail, the magistrate may, in his
discretion, increase or decrease the amount of the bail.
History: C. 1953, 77-20-8, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bail and
Recognizance §§ 6, 82 to 85.

77-20-4.

C.J.S. - 8 C.J.S. Bail § 70.
Key Numbers. - Bail <S=>53.

Bail posted in cash or written undertaking.

Bail may be posted in cash or written undertaking with or without sureties
at the discretion of the magistrate. Written undertaking shall substantially
conform to any form approved by the Supreme Court.
History: C. 1953, 77-20-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-20-5.

Qualifications of sureties - Justification
quirements of undertaking.

- Re-

(1) The sureties on written undertakings shall be real or personal property
holders within the state. The qualifications and bonding limits of bail bond
sureties who are engaged in the for-profit, commercial business of posting
property bonds shall be established by the Bail Bond Surety Licensing Board
and rules adopted by the Judicial Council. All other sureties shall collectively
have a net worth of at least twice the amount of the undertaking, exclusive of
property exempt from execution.
(2) Each surety shall justify by affidavit upon the undertaking and each may
be further examined upon oath by the magistrate or by the prosecuting
attorney in the presence of a magistrate, in respect to his property and net
worth.
(3) The undertaking shall, in addition to other requirements, provide that
each surety submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably
appoints the clerk of the court as his agent upon whom any papers affecting his
liability on the undertaking may be served, and that his liability may be
enforced on motion and upon such notice as the court may require without the
necessity of an independent action.
History: C. 1953, 77-20-5, enacted by L.
1980,ch.15,§ 2;1991,ch.242,§
1;1994,ch.
130,§ 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective March 18, 1991, restructured
the former single sentence of Subsection (1) as
the present first and third sentences, and
added the second sentence.

The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
added "the Bail Bond Surety Licensing Board
and" and made a stylistic change in the second
sentence in Subsection (1).
Cross-References.
Property exempt
from execution, § 78-23-1 et seq.
Qualification of bail bond sureties, Rule
4-407, Rules of Judicial Administration.
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COLLATERALREFERENCES

C.J.S. - 8 C.J.S. Bail § 101.
Key Numbers. - Bail e=, 55, 60, 64, 69.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bail and
Recognizance §§ 86 to 88.

77-20-6.

Release on approval of undertaking.

Upon approval of the undertaking by the magistrate, the officer having
custody of the arrested person shall release him.
History: C. 1953, 77-20-6, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
COLLATERALREFERENCES
Key Numbers. - Bail

77-20-7.

®=> 49.

Duration of liability on undertaking-Notices
sureties.

to

(1) The principal and the sureties on the written undertaking are liable
thereon during all proceedings and for all appearances required of the
defendant up to and including the surrender of the defendant in execution of
any sentence imposed irrespective of any contrary provision in the undertaking.
(2) Notice of any required appearance by the defendant may be given by the
court to the sureties who shall thereupon cause the defendant's appearance as
required. Any failure of the defendant to appear when required is a breach of
the conditions of the undertaking or bail and subjects it to forfeiture irrespective of whether or not notice was given to the sureties.
History: C. 1953, 77-20-7, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ing and surrendering himself to serve his sentence. Heninger v. Ninth Circuit Court, 739
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1987).

ANALYSIS

Liability of bondsman.
Termination of bonding authority.
-Notice and hearing.
Writ of prohibition.

Termination of bonding authority.

Liability of bondsman.
Bondsman is liable only for "all appearances
required of the defendant." He is not liable for
payment of the defendant's fine, nor is he liable
for the defendant's fidelity to the terms of his
probation. Heninger v. Ninth Circuit Court, 739
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1987).
The statutory phrase "up to and including
surrender of the defendant in execution of any
sentence imposed" clearly indicates an intent to
extend liability beyond the imposition of sentence. It contemplates the defendant's appear-

-Notice and hearing.
Circuit court abused its discretion in not
providing notice and hearing prior to termination of respondents' bonding authority.
Heninger v. Ninth Circuit Court, 739 P.2d 1108
(Utah 1987).
Writ of prohibition.
Suspension without notice of bail bondsmen's
authority to post bail in circuit court during
pendency in district court of petition challenging lawfulness of certain forfeitures was improper. Clark v. Second Circuit Court, 741 P.2d
956 (Utah 1987).
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COLLATERALREFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bail and
Recognizance§§ 104 to 110.

77-20-8.

Grounds for detaining or releasing defendant on
conviction and prior to sentence.

(1) Upon conviction, by plea or trial, the court shall order that the convicted
defendant who is waiting imposition or execution of sentence be detained,
unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence presented by the
defendant that the defendant is not likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court,
and will not pose a danger to the physical, psychological, or financial and
economic safety or well-being of any other person or the community ifreleased.
(2) If the court finds the defendant does not need to be detained, the court
shall order the release of the defendant on suitable conditions, which may
include the ~onditions under Subsection 77-20-10(2).
History: C. 1958, 77-20-8, enacted by L.
1980,ch.15,§
2; 1988,ch. 160,§ 2.
COLLATERALREFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law •- Statutory Enactments Criminal Law, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 349.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bail and

77-20-8.5.

Recognizance §§ 119 to 124, 134 to 138.
C.J.S. - 8 C.J.S. Bail§ 43.
Key Numbers. - Bail e.. 80.

Sureties - Surrender of defendant -Arrest
defendant.

of

(1) (a) The sureties may at any time prior to a forfeiture of their bail
surrender the defendant and obtain exoneration of their bail by filing
written requests at the time of the surrender.
(b) To effect surrender, certified duplicate copies of the undertaking
shall be delivered to a peace officer, who shall detain the defendant in his
custody as upon a commitment, and shall in writing acknowledge the
surrender upon one copy of the undertaking. This certified copy of the
undertaking upon which the acknowledgment of surrender is endorsed
shall be filed with the court. The court may then, upon proper application,
order the undertaking exonerated and may order a refund of any paid
premium, or part of a premium, as it finds just.
(2) For the purpose of surrendering the defendant, the sureties may arrest
him at any time before they are finally exonerated and at any place within the
state.
History: C. 1958, 77-20-8.5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 160, § 3.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Extent of rights of sureties.
If sureties do not avail themselves of the
rights given to them, they will be estopped in
an action on the undertaking from denying that
the principal was liable to arrest upon the
charge, to answer which the undertaking sued
on was given. United States v. Eldredge, 5 Utah
189, 14 P. 42 (1887), appeal dismissed, 145 U.S.
636, 12 S. Ct. 980, 36 L. Ed. 857 (1892).
As a general rule an arrest and surrender of
the principal, to be effectual as an exoneration
of the surety, must have been made before
liability of the surety under the bond or recog-

nizance had by forfeiture or judgment become
fixed, and could not be done as of right after the
forfeiture or judgment had been paid or the
surety otherwise discharged. Dickson v.
Mullings, 66 Utah 282, 241 P. 840, 43 A.L.R.
136 (1925).
Surety on bail bond forfeited for nonappearance of principal to answer charge of felonious
assault could not, two years after payment of
judgment and discharge of surety, have principal arrested, without legal process, by police in
anoth!lr jurisdiction. Dickson v. Mullings, 66
Utah 282, 241 P. 840, 43 A.L.R. 136 (1925).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law - Statutory Enactments Criminal Law, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 349.

77-20-9. Disposition

of forfeitures.

If by reason of the neglect of the defendant to appear, money deposited
instead of bail or money paid by sureties on surety bond is forfeited and the
forfeiture is not discharged or remitted, the clerk with whom it is deposited or
paid shall, immediately after final adjournment of the court, pay over the
money forfeited as follows:
(1) The forfeited bail cases in or appealed from district courts shall be
distributed as provided in Section 77-18-3;
(2) 'fhe forfeited bail in c;ases in or appealed from circuit courts shall be
distributed as provided in Section 78-4-22;
(3) The forfeited pail in cases in precinct justice courts or in municipal
justice courts shall be distributed as provided in Sections 78-5-116 and
78-5-135;
(4) The forfeited bail in cases in circuit courts, precinct justice courts, or
municipal justice courts where the offense is not triable in that court shall
be distributed as provided J:>ySection 77-18-3; and
(5) The forfeited bail in cases not provided for in this section shall be
paid 50% to the state treasurer and the remaining 50% to the county
treasurer in the county in which tne violation occurred or the forfeited bail
is collected.
History: C. 1953, 77-20-9, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1998, ch. 159, § 6.
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amend-

77-20-10.

ment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted the
present reference in Subsection (3) for "Section
78-5-39."

Grounds for detaining defendant while appealing his ~onviction - Conditions for release
while on appeal.

(1) The court shall order that a defendant who has been found guilty of an
offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in jail or prison, and who has
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filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari, be detained, unless the
court finds:
(a) the appeal raises a substantial question oflaw or fact likely to result
in:
(i) reversal;
(ii) an order for a new trial; or
(iii) a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment in jail
or prison;
(b) the appeal is not for the purpose of delay; and
(c) by clear and convincing evidence presented by the defendant that he
is not likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court, and will not pose a danger
to the physical, psychological, or financial and economic safety or wellbeing of any other person or the community if released.
(2) If the court makes a finding under Subsection (1) which justifies not
detaining the defendant, the court shall order the release of the defendant,
subject to conditions that result in the least restrictive condition or combination of conditions that the court determines will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and
the community. The conditions may include that the defendant:
(a) post appropriate bail;
(b) not commit a federal, state, or local crime during the period of
release;
(c) remain in the custody of a designated person who agrees to assume
supervision of the defendant and who agrees to report any violation of a
release condition to the court, if the designated person is reasonably able
to assure the court that the defendant will appear as required and will not
pose a dangE:lrto the safety of any other person or the community;
(d) maintain employment, or if unemployed, actively seek employment;
(e) maintain or commence an educational program;
(f) abide by specified restrictions on personal associations, place of
abode, or travel;
(g) avoid all contact with the victims of the offense and with any
witnesses who testified against the defendant or potential witnesses who
may testify concerning the offense if the appeal results in a reversal or an
order for a new trial;
(h) report on a regular basis to a designated law enforcement agency,
pretrial services agency, or other designated agency;
(i) comply with a specified curfew;
(j) not possess a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous
weapon;
(k) not use alcohol, or any narcotic drug or other controlled substances
except as prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner;
(1) undergo available medical, psychological, or psychiatric treatment,
including treatment for drug or alcohol dependency, and remain under the
supervision of or in a specified institution if required for that purpose;
(m) execute an agreement to forfeit, upon failing to appear as required,
designated property, including money, as is reasonably necessary to assure
the appearance of the defendant, and post with the court indicia of
ownership of the property or a percentage of the money as the court may
specify;
(n) execute a bail bond with solvent sureties in an amount necessary to
assure the appearance of the defendant as required;
644
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(o) return to custody for specified hours following release for employment, schooling, or other limited purposes;
(p) satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure
the appearance of the defendant as required and to assure the safety of
any other person and the community; and
(q) if convicted of committing a sexual offense or an assault or other
offense involving violence against a child 17 years of age or younger, is
limited or denied access to any location or occupation where children are,
including but not limited to:
(i) any residence where children are on the premises;
(ii) activities, including organized activities, in which children are
involved; and
(iii) locations where children congregate, or where a reasonable
person should know that children congregate.
(3) The court may, in its discretion, amend an order granting release to
impose additional or different conditions of release.
History: C. 1953, 77-20-10, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 160, § 4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability.
Cited.
Applicability.
The conditions under which a person con-

victed of a crime may be allowed bail pending
appeal are governed by this section, and not by
any state rule of criminal procedure. State v.
Larsen, 850 P.2d 1264 (Utah 1993).
Cited in State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law - Statutory Enactments Criminal Law, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 349.

77-20-11.

Bail Bond Surety Licensing BoardEstablishment - Appointment of members - Terms.

(1) There is created a Bail Bond Surety Licensing Board consisting of seven
members appointed by the Judicial Council. Membership shall be as follows:
(a) four licensed bail bond sureties;
(b) two members of the general public; and
(c) one attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah in good
standing.
(2) The initial term of four of the board members shall be two years, with the
initial term of the remaining members set at one year. Subsequent terms of all
board members shall be two years. No board member may serve more than two
consecutive terms.
(3) Board members shall serve until:
(a) removed by the Judicial Council;
(b) their resignation; or
(c) the expiration of their term and the appointment of a successor.
(4) The board shall annually elect one of its members to serve as chair.
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(5) Five members shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.
(6) Board members shall be reimbursed for all necessary traveling and
accommodation expenses in accordance with Division of Finance rules.
History: C. 1953, 77-20-11, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 130, § 2.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 130
became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to

77-20-12.

Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References.
- Judicial Council,
Rules of Judicial Administration, Chapter 1.

Bail Bond Surety Licensing Board - Duties.

The board shall:
(1) meet at least quarterly, and at the call of the chair;
(2) make written recommendations to the Judicial Council for rules
governing:
(a) license qualifications, applications, and fees;
(b) bonding limits;
(c) unprofessional conduct;
(d) procedures for hearing and resolving allegations of unprofessional conduct; and
(e) sanctions for unprofessional conduct;
(3) screen license applicants and applications;
(4) grant, renew, revoke, and reinstate licenses; and
(5) conduct hearings to investigate allegations of unprofessional conduct, entering findings of fact, and imposing appropriate sanctions.
History: C. 1953, 77-20-12, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 130, § 3.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 130

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

77-20-13.

Rulemaking authority.

Judicial Council-

The Judicial Council shall make rules to carry out the purposes of this
chapter.
History: C. 1953, 77-20-13, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 130, § 4.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 130

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

CHAPTER20a
BAIL FORFEITURE PROCEDURE
Section
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77-20a-2.
77-20a-3.
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77-20a-1.

77-20a-1

Entry in minutes as forfeiture - Notice - Release of surety on failure of notice.

(1) If a defendant fails to appear when required, the court shall enter the
fact upon its minutes, and the entry is deemed a forfeiture of the bail which has
been posted. "Bail" is defined in Section 77-20-4.
(2) The prosecuting attorney shall notify the surety of the defendant's
failure to appear when required. The term "surety" includes the defendant, or
any person, partnership, or corporation posting cash bail, or any person,
partnership, or corporation binding themselves as a surety upon a written
undertaking as provided in Section 77-20-4. The notification shall be in writing
and shall be either served by mail to the known address of the surety or served
upon the surety pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3) If the address of the surety is known and the prosecuting attorney does
not mail or serve the notice within 60 days after entry of the failure of the
defendant to appear, the surety is released from all obligations under the bail.
If the address of the surety is not known, and service of notice by publication
is necessary, and the prosecuting attorney does not commence publication of
notice by filing pleadings with the court as required by Rule 4(f)(l) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, within 90 days after entry of the failure of the
defendant to appear, the surety is released from all obligations on the bond.
History: C. 1953, 77-20a-1, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 54, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action on bond.
Appealable orders.
Breach of conditions of appeal bond.
Defendant held in foreign state.
Principal and sureties on bond.
Suspension of authority.
Waiver.

Action on bond.
An order or judgment of forfeiture was a
prerequisite to institution of action on bail
bond, and must have been both alleged and
proven. State v. Sorensen, 48 Utah 663, 160 P.
1181 (1916).
Neither ultimate nor evidentiary fact that
neglect to appear was ''without sufficient excuse" need have been entered in the minutes in
order to found upon order or judgment forfeiting bail bond an action to recover thereon. State
v. Sorensen, 48 Utah 663, 160 P. 1181 (1916).
Appealable orders.
Neither an order forfeiting a defendant's bail
for failure to appear for trial, nor a subsequent
order refusing to set aside the forfeiture, nor an
order directing that money deposited in lieu of
bail be paid into the treasury was appealable,
for they were merely steps in the criminal
proceedings. People v. Tremayne, 3 Utah 331, 3
P. 85 (1884).

Breach of conditions of appeal bond.
Bond on appeal from conviction of crime,
conditioned that defendant would surrender
himself if judgment was affirmed or modified,
or appeal was dismissed, or judgment was
reversed and cause was remanded for new trial,
was not breached by defendant's failure to
appear after judgment was reversed, on ground
of trial court's lack of jurisdiction, and cause
was remanded to be disposed of in accordance
with law. State v. Candland, 25 Utah 172, 70 P.
403 (1902).
Defendant held in foreign state.
General rule was that relief from forfeiture of
bond would be refused where defendant was at
large on date of default and was arrested in
another state after default; bond was properly
forfeited in light of evidence that defendant
failed to appear on the date set for original
arraignment, even though able, and again
failed to appear on continued date for arraignment, despite fact that defendant was subsequently seized by Tennessee authorities and
was being there held at time of hearing on
bondsman's motion to set aside forfeiture. State
v. Nelson, 20 Utah 2d 229, 436 P.2d 792 (1968).
Principal and sureties on bond.
Sureties could not set up a defense that the
accused could not have availed himselfofin his
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defense on the charge upon which the case was
based. United States v. Eldredge, 5 Utah 189,
14 P. 42 (1887), appeal dismissed, 145 U.S. 636,
12 S. Ct. 980, 36 L. Ed. 857 (1892).
If principal did not appear for trial, a denial
of his liability to arrest was a privilege that
belonged to him, to be made at the proper time,
and it did not belong to his sureties after the
time had expired for an application for exoneration for the sureties, and after bail had become
fixed. United States v. Eldredge, 5 Utah 198, 14
P. 42 (1887), appeal dismissed, 145 U.S. 636, 12
S. Ct. 980, 36 L. Ed. 857 (1892).
Suspension of authority.
Suspension without notice of bail bondsmen's

authority to post bail in circuit court during
pendency in district court of petition challenging lawfulness of certain forfeitures was improper. Clark v. Second Circuit Court, 741 P.2d
956 (Utah 1987).
Waiver.
The defendant or his bail waived the right to
excuse their neglect unless they availed themselves of the privilege promptly. The court could
not entertain such excuse after the adjournment of the term, even though it took place a
few days after the forfeiture. United States v.
Eldredge, 5 Utah 161, 13 P. 673 (1887), appeal
dismissed, 145 U.S. 636, 12 S. Ct. 980, 36 L. Ed.
857 (1892).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. - Forfeiture of bail for breach of
conditions of release other than that of appearance, 68 A.L.R.4th 1082.

77-20a-2.

Judgment on bail - Execution.

(1) Judgment upon the bail shall be entered against the surety in the
amount of the bail filed with the county jail or with the clerk of the court in not
less than 60 days after the mailing or service of the notice of the defendant's
failure to appear to the surety, in the following manner:
(a) If notice has not been given to the surety, judgment may be entered
upon a showing to the satisfaction of the court that the surety has been
mailed or served with a notice of failure to appear and that no application
to set aside the forfeiture as provided in this chapter has been filed, or, if
it has been filed, that no application is pending disposition; and
(b) Under any other circumstances, judgment may be entered only after
10 days' prior written notice to the surety.
(2) Execution on a judgment upon the bail may not issue in less than 90 days
after the completion of the mailing or service of a notice of entry of judgment
upon the surety. However, after reasonable notice to the prosecuting attorney
and upon good cause shown to the satisfaction of the forfeiting court, the court
shall extend the period during which execution may not issue for a period or
periods not to exceed in the aggregate an additional 60 days.
History: C. 1953, 77-20a-2, enacted by L.
1.
1983,ch.54,§

77-20a-3.

Setting aside forfeiture or judgment - Grounds
- Time for application.

(1) The court ordering forfeiture shall set aside the forfeiture of bail or
judgment upon the bail on the following grounds:
(a) A showing to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant is
deceased; and
(b) The payment of liquidated costs as provided in this chapter and
either:
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(i) The personal appearance of the defendant before the forfeiting
court; or
(ii) A showing to the satisfaction of the forfeiting court that at the
time the defendant's appearance was required, the defendant was
unable to appear in the court due to illness, insanity, or other
reasonable cause, not including detention by military or civil authorities.
(2) Applications to set aside the forfeiture of bail shall be made in writing,
prior to the entry of judgment, in the following manner:
(a) When the defendant personally appears before the forfeiting court
or is in the actual custody of the county sheriff, without prior notice to the
prosecuting attorney; or
(b) When the defendant does not personally appear before the forfeiting
court or is not in the actual custody of the county sheriff, only upon five
days' prior written notice to the prosecuting attorney.
(3) Applications to set aside the judgment upon the bail shall be made in
writing, prior to the first day when execution of judgment may be issued and
must be heard within 10 days after the first day when execution may issue, and
upon five days' prior written notice to the prosecuting attorney.
History: C. 1953, 77-20a-3, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 54, § 1.

77-20a-4. Defendant detained by other authority - Procedure - Costs of returning defendant.
(1) If a defendant is detained by any military or civil authorities prior to the
first day when execution of judgment upon the bail may be issued, the bail is
forfeited and judgment upon the bail entered according to the procedures
provided by this chapter unless the surety exercises one of the following
options, in writing, by filing a notice of intent with the court prior to the first
day when execution of judgment may be issued and by mailing a copy to the
prosecuting attorney:
(a) Payment ofliquidated costs as provided and return the defendant to
the custody of the county sheriff at the surety's expense; or
(b) Pay liquidated costs as provided and pay the costs of extradition of
the defendant including transportation costs and per diem for peace
officers to return the defendant to the custody of the county sheriff.
(2) Upon written motion and a finding by the forfeiting court that a
reasonable period of time is necessary in order for the surety to return a
defendant who is detained by any military or civil authorities to the custody of
the county sheriff, the court shall stay the execution of judgment against the
surety for periods of time as are reasonable.
(3) If the prosecuting attorney elects not to seek the return of a defendant
who is detained by any military or civil authorities prior to the first day when
execution may be issued, the obligation of the surety ceases and the bail is
exonerated.
(4) If the surety does not pay the costs of extradition after having elected
option (b) as set forth in Section 77-20a-4(1)(b) above, judgment in the amount
of the costs of extradition shall be entered against the surety, after five days
notice to the surety, and upon motion of the prosecuting attorney. Proof of the
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amount and non-payment of the costs of extradition may be made py affidavit
of the prosecuting attorney.
(5) If the surety objects to the imposition or the amount of extradition costs,
the forfeiting court shall allow the surety a hearing to determine those issues,
upon written application and notice to the prosecuting attorney. During the
pendency of the hearing, a judgment for liquidated costs may not be entered.
(6) Execution upon the judgment for extradition costs may not issue in fewer
than 10 days from the mailing of a notice of entry of the judgment by the
prosecuting attorney to the surety.
mstory: C. 1953, 77-20a-4, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 54, § 1.

77-20a-5.

Liquidated costs of returning defendant
Judgment against surety - Execution.

Liquidated costs are the fees required by law to be paid to:
(a) Witnesses, and include a witness fee and mileage for every witness
who actually appeared on the action against the defendant and who was
actually paid the fee; and to
(b) Jurors, and include a daily fee and mileage for each member of a
panel of jurors actually appearing to hear the case against the defendant,
but which were excused without being sworn prior to being impanelled on
the case against the defendant or on any other case.
(2) If the surety does not pay the liquidated costs within 10 days after the
prosecuting attorney mails a memorandum of the costs to the surety, judgment
against the surety shall be entered in the amount of the liquidated costs upon
the motion of the prosecuting attorney and after five days' notice to the surety.
Proof of the amount and non-payment of liquidated costs may be made by
affidavit of the prosecuting attorney.
(3) If the surety objects to the imposition or the amount of the liquidated
costs, the forfeiting court shall allow the surety a hearing to determine the
issues upon written application and notice to the prosecuting attorney. During
the pendency of the hearing, a judgment for liquidated costs may not be
entered.
( 4) Execution on the judgment for liquidated costs may not issue in less than
10 days from the completion of a mailing of a notice of entry of the judgment
by the prosecuting attorney to the surety.
(1)

History: C. 1953, 77-20a-5, enacted by L.
1983,ch.54,§
1.

77-20a-6.

Execution of judgment.

If a judgment upon the bail, or for costs of extradition, or for liquidated costs,
is not paid on or before the first date when execution may issue, the
prosecuting attorney may:
(1) execute the judgment pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
or
(2) exercise any remedy authorized by state statute.
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History: C. 1953, 77•20a-6, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 54, § 1.

CHAPTER21
UNIFORM ACT TO SECURE THE
ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FROM
WITHOUT A STATE IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
Section
77-21-1.
77-21-2.
77-21-3.

Short title - Construction.
Procedure to secure attendance in
another state.
Procedure to secure attendance of
witness from without state.

Section
77-21-4.
77-21-5.

Fees.
Witnesses not subject to arrest or
service of process.

77-21-1. Short title - Construction.
This chapter may be cited as the "Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of
Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings." It shall be interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
law of the states which enact it.
History: C. 1953, 77-21-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Uµiform Laws. - This uniform act has

been adopted in all 50 states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Confrontation of accused.
Reliability of witness.

resented by counsel who had and took an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness at •the preliminary hearing. State v.
Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982).

Confrontation of accused.
When an out-of-state witness is not present
at trial, use of this act by the state is not
required as a condition precedent to the use at
trial of testimony given by that witness at a
preliminary hearing; use of such testimony at
trial does not violate a defendant's constitutional confrontation rights if the state has
taken steps to secure voluntary attendance at
trial by the witness, those steps meet the "good
faith efforts" test, and the defendant was rep-

Reliability of witness.
While permissive use of this chapter should
continue to be the norm in Utah, the prosecution should have used it for a witness whose
lifestyle and nomadic habits made it clear that
she might disappear or refuse to appear for
trial and whose financial condition evidenced a
lack of funds with which to travel from her
home in Alabama. State v. Case, 752 P.2d 356
(Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 765 P.2d 1277
(Utah 1987).

ANALYSIS

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses
§ 34 et seq.
A.L.R. - Availability under Uniform Act to
secure the attendance of witnesses from without a state in criminal proceedings of subpoena
duces tecum, 7 A.L.R.4th 836.
Sufficiency of evidence to support or require

finding that in-state witness in criminal case is
"material and necessary" justifying issuance of
summons directing attendance of witness under Uniform Act to secure the attendance of
witnesses from without a state in criminal
proceedings, 12 A.L.R.4th 771.
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